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ABSTRACT
This Article develops a theory of rhetoric in corporate law
jurisprudence. It begins by examining a recent innovation in
Delaware case law: the emerging principle of “good faith.” Good
faith is an old notion in law generally, but it offers to bring significant
change to corporate law, including realignment of the business
judgment rule and a shift in the traditional balance between the
authority of boards and the accountability of boards to courts. This
Article argues, however, that good faith functions as a rhetorical
device rather than a substantive standard. That is, it operates as a
speech act, a performance, as opposed to a careful method of analysis.
To explain the sudden appearance of good faith, this Article
articulates a model of corporate law rhetoric. Courts invent rhetorical
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devices to loosen corporate law doctrine and increase judicial review
of board decisionmaking in response to scandals and other extralegal
pressures operating upon the judiciary. These pressures stem largely
from the twin threats of corporate migration and federal preemption,
both of which imperil the primacy of the Delaware judiciary as a
corporate lawmaker. In periods of crisis and scandal, the judiciary
employs rhetorical devices to reduce these pressures, typically with the
effect of increasing board accountability, only to return, once the
pressure recedes, to a position of board deference. After finding
several examples of this pattern in corporate law history, this Article
argues, ultimately, that regular movement back and forth along the
authority/accountability spectrum is an essential feature of corporate
law jurisprudence and that understanding the rhetorical devices that
permit this movement is necessary to complete any account of what
corporate law is and how it works.
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INTRODUCTION
After a period of scandal and crisis in American corporate
governance, corporate law has rediscovered good faith.
Good faith is not a new idea. It has long been recognized as a
background principle in several areas of law,1 and no corporate
lawyer who was not guilty of malpractice has ever advised a board of
directors that its members could safely behave in bad faith.2 In
Delaware, the primary source of American corporate law,3 both the
legislature and the courts have recognized some notion of good faith.
Good faith is a prerequisite to a corporation’s ability, under
§ 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, to absolve its
directors for liabilities incurred in shareholder litig ation.4 Moreover,
the Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged good faith in its
corporate law opinions, occasionally ranking it alongside the
traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and thereby implying
that good faith is to be given a role in fiduciary duty analysis equal to
the other two.5
1. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith,
Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. R EV. 955 (1995) (describing good faith in
various areas of law); Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long -Term Open Quantity Contracts:
Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 319 (2002) (tracing judicial development of good
faith in commercial contracts).
2. See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directors, Officers and Key
Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 652, 658–59 (1979) (“I don’t think it would ever have been
possible to persuade Delaware courts that the Business Judgment Rule prevents a transaction
from being enjoined or immunizes directors from personal liability if it is established that the
directors did not act in good faith . . . .”). In fact, it is a common summation of a director’s
corporate law obligations to state that she must exercise her fiduciary duties in good faith. See,
e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 983–84 (Del.
Ch. 2003) (describing an allegation that “called into question the directors’ good faith exercise
of their fiduciary duties”).
3. The number of major firms incorporating in Delaware and the willingness of other
states to be guided by Delaware has established Delaware law as national corporate law. See
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM.
J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) (“The aggregated choices of a majority of publicly traded U.S.
corporations have resulted in a convergence on the Delaware General Corporation Law as a de
facto national corporate law.”); see also Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions
Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 389 (2003) (supplying statistics showing that
Delaware is the state of incorporation for half of all public companies and 59 percent of the
Fortune 500).
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see discussion infra Part I.A.
5. These cases refer to a “triad” of fiduciary duties, including care, loyalty, and good faith.
See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (“The directors of Delaware
corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith.”);
McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000) (“[T]he shareholder plaintiff must effectively
provide evidence that the defendant board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision,
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The function of good faith in corporate law, however, is not
perfectly clear. For all of the judicial and legislative references to it,
the principle is defined neither in the Delaware statute nor in judicial
precedent.6 And although everyone understands it, in some general
sense, good faith is a difficult concept to operationalize in law.7 The
Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged that good faith is an
amorphous principle, the meaning of which “varies somewhat with
the context.”8 In the context of corporate law, it is difficult to give
breached any one of its triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or due care.” (internal
quotation omitted)); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“The director’s fiduciary
duty to both the corporation and its shareholders has been characterized by this Court as a triad:
due care, good faith, and loyalty.”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.
1993) (“To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that
directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary
duty—good faith, loyalty or due care.”).
6. See John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to
Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging
Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111,
119 (2004) (“Unfortunately . . . ‘good faith’ is not defined anywhere in the [Delaware General
Corporation Law]. Nor does the framing of § 102(b)(7) provide any helpful insight.”). The
Delaware Supreme Court opinions listing good faith alongside care and loyalty in the “triad” of
fiduciary duties neither define good faith nor rely upon it to reach the outcome of the case. See
supra note 5 and accompanying text. Moreover, the separate status of good faith may be the
result of a longstanding confusion between the categories of fiduciary duty and the means by
which a plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule. The string of citations in note 5, supra, all
trace ultimately to Aronson v. Lewis, where a breach of good faith is listed alongside violations
of care and loyalty as situations to which the business judgment rule will not apply , not as a
separate and equal mode for analyzing fiduciary duty . 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). It is well
understood that there are a handful of situations to which the business judgment rule does not
apply, such as waste and illegality. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business
Judgment Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW.
1355, 1369 (1993) (“[T]he absence of waste, egregious conduct, illegality, fraud, and ultra vires
conduct also is necessary for [the business judgment rule’s] application.”). These, however, are
treated as sui generis circumstances, not as separate modes of fiduciary duty analysis. Judicial
recitations of good faith as a separate fiduciary duty are thus the result of a quotation taken out
of context.
7. A general sense of good faith may involve consistency between word and deed. See,
e.g., PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
COMMENTARY N O. 10 (§ 1-203) (final draft Feb. 10, 1994) (defining good faith as “honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned” but ultimately concluding that good faith alone
“does not support a cause of action where no other basis for a cause of action exists”); see also
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. R EV. 369, 378–85 (1980) (arg uing that good faith limits a party’s discretion in
performance to actions taken for reasons allowed by the original contract); David Rosenberg,
Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach,
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 512 (2004) (arguing that good faith in corporate law should be
interpreted in the same way as it is in the law of contracts).
8. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443 (Del. 1996) (quoting
R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a. (1979)). The court pursued the
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good faith any content that does not merely restate either the duty of
care or the duty of loyalty.9 If one thinks of good faith as doing the
job right or adequately fulfilling one’s fiduciary obligations, then it
drifts towards the sort of prudential issues ordinarily addressed under
the duty of care.10 Likewise, if one thinks of good faith as acting
selflessly in the corporation’s interest, then it slides towards issues
typically analyzed under the duty of loyalty.11 In his attempt to pin
down its meaning, then-Chancellor Allen suggested that good faith

Restatement quotation, adding “[g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party.” Id. Tellingly, the court went on to suggest that good faith has
no content of its own, except in relation to an alleged misdeed:
[Good faith is] a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves
to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. In a particular context
the phrase takes on specific meaning, but usually this is only by way of contrast with
the specific form of bad faith actually or hypothetically excluded.
Id. at 443 (quoting Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA . L. R EV. 195, 201 (1968) (footnotes
omitted)).
9. On the traditional division of corporate fiduciary obligations into the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty, see infra Part I.A.
10. Defining good faith as adequately fulfilling one’s obligations, obviously, is question
begging. To understand it, one must ask what one’s obligations are and then ask whether those
obligations have been adequately fulfilled. Each of these inquiries, however, is highly
problematic. The first reveals the definition as circular, defining a fiduciary obligation (good
faith) in terms of the fulfillment of fiduciary obligations, while the second question is squarely
under the duty of care and therefore cannot be asked without disturbing the business judgment
rule. On the relationship of good faith to the business judgment rule, see infra Part I.A.
11. Several closely reasoned chancery court opinions treat good faith as an aspect of the
duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 14 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[T]he duty to
act in ‘good faith’ is merely a subset of a director’s duty of loyalty.”); In re Gaylord Container
Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (arguing that good faith, correctly
understood, is a component of the duty of loyalty). Moreover, justices of the Delaware Supreme
Court have occasionally viewed good faith as a mere aspect of the duty of loyalty. Justice
Jacobs, for example, when still a vice chancellor, wrote in his opinion in Emerald Partners v.
Berlin that “doctrinally [the] obligation [to act in good faith] does not exist separate and apart
from the fiduciary duty of loyalty.” Civ. Action No. 9700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *86 n.63
(Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2001). A few years later, having been appointed to the Supreme Court, but
sitting by designation at the chancery court, Jacobs retreated from these statements, stating that
the defendant may have breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty “and/or” good faith and noting
“[t]he Court employs the ‘and/or’ phraseology because the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to
articulate the precise differentiation between the duties of loyalty and of good faith.” In re
Emerging Comm’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consol. Civ. Action No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS
70, at *142 n.184 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). Similarly, it was Chancellor Chandler, who confidently
announced in Orman that good faith was merely an aspect of the duty of loyalty, Orman, 794
A.2d at 14 n.3, who then allowed the plaintiffs in Disney to survive dismissal on the basis of
good faith when the question of loyalty was not properly before the court, In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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may simply be a shorthand reference to the welfare-maximization
goals underlying corporate law.12
But the role of good faith in corporate law jurisprudence is
changing. An emerging line of cases rejects a vision of good faith as
mere shorthand for the duties of care and loyalty and establishes it,
instead, as an independent basis for decision. By sustaining causes of
action under the principle of good faith when neither traditional
mode of fiduciary duty analysis is available, these cases carve a
separate doctrinal role for good faith with distinct adjudicative power,
opening board governance decisions to a greater degree of judicial
scrutiny. This is not a small change. It frees courts from the confines
of care and loyalty in reviewing governance decisions and promises to
shift the fulcrum on the scale balancing the authority of boards and
their accountability to courts.13 Given the hitherto amorphous
character of good faith, this new doctrinal role raises several urgent
questions. Most basically , what will good faith come to mean in
corporate law? Will it create a new cause of action for shareholder
plaintiffs? Will it rewrite the business judgment rule, leading to
greater judicial intervention in corporate governance and a lasting
shift in the authority/accountability balance?
This Article aims to answer those questions. In it, I argue that the
emerging duty of good faith is best understood as a rhetorical device
rather than as a substantive standard. Good faith, in other words, is
not now and is not likely ever to develop into a distinct doctrine of
subrules and multipart tests. Instead, the pattern in the good faith
cases is to raise issues under both the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty but, rather than following either traditional analysis through
to a conclusion, to blend the issues together and, in doing so, identify
a basis for liability under the duty of good faith. This mode of
analysis, involving the oscillation between two distinct doctrinal
categories, I will call “thaumatrope analytics.” The term refers to an
optical toy involving a disk with a different image on each side—a
horse and a man, for example, or a bird and a cage—and a string
12. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“By
‘bad faith’ is meant a transaction that is authorized for some purpose other than a genuine
attempt to advance corporate welfare . . . .”).
13. Throughout this Article, I will use the terms (board) authority and (judicial)
accountability to refer to the balance between the authority of boards, on the one hand, and
the accountability of boards to courts, on the other. By “judicial accountability,” I mean
the accountability of boards to the judiciary and not, as the phrase is sometimes used, the
accountability of the judiciary to some other authority.
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attached at either edge of the disk enabling the device to spin.14 When
the viewer spins the thaumatrope, the images on either side of the
disk seem to blend together to produce a third image that is a
composite of the other two—the man atop the horse or the bird in the
cage. Good faith, I argue, is simply the application of the
thaumatrope to the duties of care and loyalty. Spinning the two
together, the composite image—of a poor decisionmaking process
mixed with hints of conflicting interest—may trigger liability under
something the judiciary now calls “good faith.”
By distinguishing rhetoric from substance, I do not mean to
denigrate the significance of either good faith or rhetoric, but rather
to emphasize good faith as a speech act, a performance, as opposed to
a carefully delineated mode of analysis.15 My account of good faith as
a rhetorical device stresses, first and foremost, its contextual
contingency. The duty of good faith emerged in an environment of
sturm und drang in corporate governance, when a series of scandals—
including frauds and failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and
Adelphia, celebrity insider trading, and corruption in the IPO
market—drew American corporate governance into question and
14. The thaumatrope was popularized by John Aytron Paris in the 1820s. The name is
derived from the Greek “thauma,” wondrous or marvelous, and “trope,” something that turns
or spins. The term was brought into the legal literature by Leon Lipson to criticize Cardozo’s
analysis in the Allegheny College opinion. Leon S. Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 23
Y ALE L. R EP. 8, 11 (1977).
15. I take this understanding of rhetoric from the law-and-literature movement. See JAMES
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW 28 (1984) (defining rhetoric as “the central art by which culture
and community are established, maintained, and transformed”); Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric
of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES, 187, 187 (Brooks & Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“Judicial
opinions are rhetorical performances. The critic who essays an assessment of any performance,
whether dramatic or judicial, must be aware, among other things, of the particular role assigned
to the actor, the likely audience for the performance, and the effects sought by the performer.”).
Professor White further describes how to read a work for its rhetorical meaning:
The basic question we shall ask of the texts we read, and of the pa rticular
performances within them, will thus be What kind of action with words is this? This
question will be elaborated by being broken down into two others: What kind of
relationship does this writer establish with his language? and What kind of
relationship does he establish with his audience or reader? To put this in other words:
What kind of cultural action is this writing? and What kind of social action is it?
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 6 (1984). The rhetorical meaning
of a text is not necessarily distinct from its analytical meaning, and I seek to distinguish the two
only to emphasize the rhetorical aspect of good faith in arguing, ultimately, that strategic
considerations dominate the analytic content of the new doctrine. This distinguishes my account
of good faith from those seeking to locate a substantive principle of law in the emerging line of
jurisprudence. See infra Part I.C. For a similar treatment of “good faith” in contract law, see
generally Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty
Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. R EV. 1.
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plunged previously settled questions into heated debate. Post-Enron,
the responsiveness (or laxity) of the states, Delaware in particular, in
matters of corporate governance was hotly contested. The good faith
thaumatrope is a response, in rhetoric, to this environment of crisis
and debate.
In probing the nature of this response, this Article argues that
the purpose and effect of such rhetoric is to loosen the doctrinal
constraints on the Delaware judiciary and to enable its judges to shift
the authority/accountability balance in response to a change in the set
of pressures and constraints then operating upon them. These
pressures stem largely from the twin threats of corporate migration
and federal preemption, both of which imperil the primacy of the
Delaware judiciary as a corporate lawmaker, but each of which varies
in strength depending upon the extralegal environment of scandal or
calm. This forms the basis of my theory of rhetoric in corporate law
jurisprudence. In periods of crisis and scandal, the judiciary employs
rhetorical devices to increase the accountability of boards, making the
judiciary appear responsive and thus alleviating the pressures acting
on it. Once the pressure recedes, however, the judiciary returns to a
position of board deference.16 An implication of this theory is that in
predicting corporate law outcomes, the world outside the
courtroom—specifically, the context of crisis or calm and the relative
threat of migration or preemption—is at least as important as, and
perhaps more important than, the doctrine itself. Another
implication, applying this theory of corporate law rhetoric to the
emerging jurisprudence of good faith, is that the breadth of judicial
scrutiny promised by the new doctrine will eventually narrow as the
crisis that spurred its creation recedes.
16. In this I am neither criticizing nor celebrating the judiciary for invading the domain of
board authority, nor am I pressing a normative claim about the optimal balance of board
authority and judicial accountability in corporate governance. These issues have been debated
by numerous eminent scholars, arguing on the one hand that greater accountability is necessary
to reign in board excesses and, on the other, that greater accountability imposes substantial
costs on all companies for a highly questionable deterrence effect on a (possibly small) subset of
wrongdoers. Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 N W. U. L. R EV. 547 (2003) (advancing a model of corporate
governance based on board authority), with Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sa rbanes-Oxley Act and
the Reinvention of Corporate Governance, 48 VILL. L. R EV. 1189, 1189 n.2 (2003) (calling for
greater regulation of corporate governance on the basis that “the laxity of Dela ware law. . . with
[its] shameful and disingenuous opinions . . . can no longer be in dispute”). Because the ultimate
resolution of this debate depends on empirical evidence that currently does not exist, rather
than offering a normative account of how Delaware law should work, I am offering, instead, a
descriptive account of how Delaware law does work.
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This Article’s prediction that good faith will not become a fixed
doctrine of corporate law should not be taken as an argument that the
emerging jurisprudence of good faith is unimportant. Good faith may,
after all, return with the next set of corporate governance scandals.
But, even if it does not, the jurisprudence of good faith represents a
paradigmatic example of corporate law rhetoric, illustrating its ability
to shift and, once the undercurrents acting upon the judiciary have
changed, to shift back. This pattern recurs so often and is so
fundamental to the structure of corporate law jurisprudence that no
understanding of corporate law can be complete without it. The
central contribution of this Article is its elucidation of the underlying
rhetorical structure of corporate law through a close examination of
the jurisprudence of good faith.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I situates good faith in
existing corporate law doctrine, describing in particular its
relationship with the business judgment rule and statutory law, then
tracing the emergence of good faith jurisprudence through a line of
Delaware cases and evaluating attempts to import some substantive
content into the meaning of good faith. Next, Part II argues that the
duty of good faith is best understood as a rhetorical device and shows
how the device seems to operate—that is, by oscillating between
concerns typically raised under the duties of care and loyalty. Part II
also emphasizes the contextual contingency of good faith analyses,
situating the emergence of good faith in the recent environment of
corporate scandal. Part III then engages the question of the future of
good faith in corporate law, describing the system of constraints
operating upon the Delaware judiciary, and ultimately arguing that
the jurisprudence of good faith is both bounded by the constraints
operating upon the judiciary and a means of manipulating those
bounds.
I. GOOD FAITH IN CORPORATE LAW
A. The Background of Business Judgment
Fiduciary duty analyses traditionally focus on the duties of
loyalty and care.17 The duty of loyalty, in its simplest formulation, is a
17. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (“Duty of care and
duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in the service of
a corporation and its stockholders. Each of these duties is of equal and independent
significance.” (citation omitted)); Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate
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proscription against director conflict of interest and self-dealing.18
Meanwhile, the duty of care, stated on its own terms,19 requires simply
that directors in control of the corporate enterprise exercise the same
level of care that would be expected of ordinarily prudent persons in
the conduct of their own affairs.20 In theory, at least, each of these
fiduciary duties is an available basis for shareholder causes of action
seeking to challenge board decisionmaking. In practice, however, the
business judgment rule operates as a significant barrier to claims

Law, 38 B.C. L. R EV. 595, 599 n.9 (1997) (“Legal conventions divide fiduciary obligations into
obligations of loyalty and obligations of care.”).
18. A comprehensive statement of duty-of-loyalty principles appears in Guth v. Loft, Inc.:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and
confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy,
existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer
or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty,
not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
charge, but also to er frain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might
properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its
powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (emphasis added); cf. Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering
Loyalty Discourse In Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 29–30 (2003) (developing a
broader account of loyalty that distinguishes a “non-betrayal” aspect from a “devotion” aspect).
19. That is, without application of the business judgment rule. See infra notes 20–21.
20. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (requiring that directors act as would
“ordinarily prudent and diligent men . . . under similar circumstances”); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney,
Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he duty of care refers to the responsibility of a
corporate fiduciary to exercise . . . the care that a reasonably prudent person in a similar
position would use under similar circumstances.”); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188
A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are
bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances.”). Application of the business judgment rule changes the liability standard under
the duty of care from negligence—that is, reasonableness or ordinary prudence—to gross
negligence. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“While the Delaware cases use a
variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under
the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”
(footnote omitted)). A shift in the standard of liability does not ne cessarily imply a shift in the
standard of care. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form:
A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1311
(2001) (emphasizing that the business judgment rule is a standard of judicial review, distinct
from the standards of conduct that directors are expected to uphold); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM
L. R EV. 437, 443 (1993) (distinguishing the duty of care, as standards of conduct, from the
business judgment rule, as a standard of review). However, a reduction in probable liability for
carelessness may have an impact on director incentives to take care, thereby resulting in a de
facto shift in the standard of care.
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under the duty of care.21 If the shareholder plaintiff cannot plead facts
sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule’s substantive
standards,22 the rule will apply, with the typical effect that the board
wins, the shareholder loses, and the court stays out of it.23
This analytical structure creates a significant obstacle to court
intervention in corporate governance decisions which, in the absence
of director conflict of interest, raise issues only under the duty of care
and are subsequently protected from judicial intervention by the
business judgment rule.24 The business judgment rule, in other words,
21. See R OBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986):
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged
or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for
the consequences of their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that
appear to have been clear mistakes—unless certain exceptions apply.
Id. The business judgment rule operates both as an evidentiary presumption and as a
substantive standard. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Although the business judgment rule
applies equally to each fiduciary duty as an evide ntiary presumption, as a substantive standard
the rule applies differently depending upon which of the directors’ fiduciary duties is under
review. See CLARK, supra, at 124 n.7 (“The ‘gross negligence’ formulation is concerned only
with adjusting the business judgment rule to the fiduciary duty of care; the duty of loyalty . . . is
another matter.”). A plaintiff challenging the board’s actions under the duty of care must allege
facts that show that the board’s conduct rises (or falls) to the level of “gross negligence.” See
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (“We think the concept of gross
negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by
a board of directors was an informed one.”); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. By contrast, a plaintiff
challenging the board’s actions under the duty of loyalty does not bear the burden of
establishing a gross conflict of interest. Any material conflict of interest on the part of the board
will rebut the business judgment rule and require the board to establish that the challenged
decision or transaction was either approved by disinterested directors, ratified by shareholders,
or fair to the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2003) (providing that conflict of
interests transactions are not void or voidable if they are either approved, ratified, or fair);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (establishing the standard of entire
fairness: “[w]hen directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of
the bargain”).
22. These claims are evaluated at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman,
794 A.2d 5, 15 (Del. Ch. 2002) (emphasizing that the plaintiff’s claim must be must be supported
by facts and not mere conclusory assertions). The principle sources of facts available to plaintiffs
at this prediscovery stage in the litigation are media accounts, public filings, and board minutes.
Id. at 16 n.9.
23. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (“If a shareholder plaintiff
fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule operates to provide substantive
protection for the directors and for the decisions that they have made.”).
24. Director accountability under state law for corporate governance decisions is a matter
of theory as opposed to reality . See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52
(Del. Ch. 1996), in which Chancellor Allen noted:
There is a theoretical exception to [the business judgment rule] that holds that some
decisions may be so ‘egregious’ that liability . . . may follow even in the absence of
proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation. The exception, however, has
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establishes corporate law’s balance between board authority and
judicial accountability.25 It protects the authority of the board to
govern the corporation without having to account to courts for their
decisions. Delaware’s basic policy choice is a robust interpretation of
the business judgment rule and respect for the principle of
nonintervention in corporate governance.26 The business judgment
rule, however, is a moving frontier. Judges decide themselves when
and how it will constrain them,27 and the Delaware judiciary has
recently used the principle of good faith to loosen its constraints.

resulted in no awards of money judgments against corporate officers or directors in
[Delaware] . . . . Thus, to allege that a corporation has suffered a loss . . . does not
state a claim for relief against that fiduciary no ma tter how foolish the investment . . . .
Id. at 1052; see also Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 242 (noting
that although agency costs may be understood as the sum of managerial selfishness and
managerial foolishness, legal liability attaches only to selfishness since “[t]he liability standard
that corporate law applies to managerial decisions is, realistically, no liability at all for mistakes,
absent fraud or conflict of interest”). Roe further states:
Conventional corporate law does little, or nothing, to directly re duce shirking,
mistakes, and bad business decisions that squander shareholder value. The business
judgment rule is, absent fraud or conflict of interest, nearly insurmountable in
America, insulating directors and managers from judges and freeing them from legal
scrutiny.
Id. at 243.
25. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
V AND. L. R EV. 83, 103 (2004) (describing the tradeoff between authority and accountability as a
central concern of corporate governance and noting that “[t]he difficulty is that authority and
accountability are ultimately antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less
of the other”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA . L. R EV. 1619, 1699 (2001) (describing
the business judgment rule as a “jurisdictional boundary” protecting the governance principle of
authority within the firm and concluding that “[w]ithout respect for the boundary, centralized
management could not operate as it does”).
26. The principle of nonintervention is apparent in the care taken by members of the
Delaware judiciary to avoid becoming “super-directors.” See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 266 (Del. 2000) (“To rule otherwise would invite courts to become super-directors,
measuring matters of degree in business decisionmaking and executive compensation.”); In re
RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *14 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan.
31, 1989) (“To recognize in courts a residual power to review the substance of business decisions
for ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonableness’ or ‘rationality’ where those decisions are made by truly
disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to make of courts superdirectors.”).
27. The question of how much to intervene in corporate decisionma king ha s been
described by Chief Justice Veasey as corporate law’s “defining tension” and by Chancellor
Allen as “the tension that occupies its core.” See William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation
Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 894–95 (1997) (referring to “the tension between the ways in
which long -term wealth may be maximized through broad managerial discretion and the ways
long-term wealth maximization may be thought to require protections that entail limitation on
the power of management”); E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate
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Delaware law has at least two doctrinal hooks from which to
hang a jurisprudence of good faith. First, good faith appears as a
statutory limitation on the ability of a corporation to exculpate its
directors for breach of fiduciary duty. Second, good faith is often
recited as an aspect of the business judgment rule. In spite of these
doctrinal bases, neither the functional meaning of good faith nor its
potential relationship to other corporate law doctrines has ever been
specified.
The statutory basis of good faith is Section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, which permits corporations,
through the adoption of a charter term—a so-called “102(b)(7)
provision”—to exculpate directors for violations of fiduciary duty
provided that the director’s liabilities do not arise from a breach of
the duty of loyalty or, the statute adds, from conduct “not in good
faith.”28 Corporations rushed to adopt 102(b)(7) provisions after the
section entered the Delaware code,29 with the practical effect of
creating a dismissal right for shareholder claims under the duty of
care.30 That section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware code is designed to
protect directors from liability for violating the duty of care can be
gleaned from the statute itself—loyalty, after all, is carved out—but it
is most clear when the statutory amendment is considered in light of
the circumstances surrounding its adoption.
The Delaware legislature adopted § 102(b)(7) in 1987 after the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom31 raised
the risks of serving as a director of a Delaware corporation. In
analyzing the conduct of the Trans Union board of directors under
the duty of care, the court in Van Gorkom did not claim to change the
law—the business judgment rule standard of gross negligence was
Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 403 (1997) (framing corporate law in terms of “the
tension between deference to directors’ decisions and the scope of judicial review”).
28. Under § 102(b)(7), there are four enumerated exclusions to the ability of a corporation
to eliminate or limit director liability, including (i) breach of the duty of loyalty; (ii) acts or
omissions not in good faith or involving intentional misconduct or knowing violations of law;
(iii) unlawful payment of dividends; or (iv) self-interested transactions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (1999).
29. See generally Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOZO L. R EV. 709 (1987) (studying corporate adoption of § 102(b)(7) provisions after
passage of the statute and finding, on the basis of event studies, no significant stock price
reaction).
30. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999) (specifying that
the corporation’s rights under the § 102(b)(7) provision is “in the nature of an affirmative
defense”).
31. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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held to apply—but it applied the standard of gross negligence
aggressively, resulting in an unprecedented finding that the board had
breached it.32 The majority of commentators now agree that on the
merits the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Trans
Union board had been grossly negligent.33 Instead, the court’s
strained interpretation of gross negligence suggested that courts,
through similarly loose interpretations, might begin to have a voice in
corporate governance notwithstanding the supposed constraint of the
business judgment rule.34
It is against this background that the legislature passed section
102(b)(7), insulating directors from liability under the duty of care
and, perhaps more importantly, cutting off any further growth in the
court’s corporate governance jurisprudence. Because the dynamics of
102(b)(7) created an immediate dismissal right for duty-of-care
claims, there was no room for further innovation in the court’s
corporate governance jurispr udence through loose interpretations of
the gross negligence standard. The passage of 102(b)(7), in other
words, was the legislature’s affirmation of the principle that the
judiciary would stay out of corporate governance, provided that the
board did not behave disloyally or, as the statute added, in bad faith.
Unfortunately, the meaning of good faith in 102(b)(7) remains a
mystery. The concept is defined neither in the statute nor in the
legislative history. And, although canons of statutory construction
suggest that the concept, because it appears as a separate numbered
item,35 has some meaning distinct from loyalty and self-interest and
that this meaning, judging by nearby words in the series,36 may have
something to do with “intentional misconduct” or “knowing
violations,” until recently the judiciary has done nothing to fill this
statutory lacuna.
The legislature is not alone in creating confusion around the
meaning of good faith. Outside of the 102(b)(7) context, Delaware
courts occasionally recite good faith as an aspect of the business
32. Id. at 864.
33. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van
Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 N W. U. L. R EV. 631, 631 (2002) (“Considered a legal
disaster in 1985, it is judged no less disastrous today.” (citations, noting criticisms of the
decision, omitted)).
34. The strain is evident in the majority opinion itself, which, in the words of the dissent,
reads “like an adv ocate’s closing address to a hostile jury.” Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
35. See, e.g., R EED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
233 (1975) (describing reddendo singular singulis—“referring each to each”).
36. Id. (describing noscitur a sociis—“known from its associates”).
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judgment rule. It is here, however, that a distinct principle of good
faith begins to clash with more established corporate law doctrines. In
the standard formulation of the business judgment rule—that is, “a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company”37 —the board’s good faith is part of what is presumed.38 The
burden of disproving it, like the burden of challenging the adequacy
of the board’s information or process, is allocated to the shareholder
plaintiff. The standard that the plaintiff must meet to overcome this
burden, however, is unclear. Should gross negligence be the standard
for establishing lack of good faith, as it is for establishing a lack of
information or other failure of the board’s duty of care?
The question of what standard to apply to good faith begs the
further question of what precisely the plaintiff is seeking to disprove.
Is it really distinct from the collection of concerns customarily
grouped under the categories of care and loyalty? If good faith is
indistinct from concerns underlying traditional fiduciary duty
analyses, then it may make sense to collapse the standard for good
faith into the standard of care or loyalty. If, on the other hand, good
faith is conceptualiz ed as distinct from each of the traditional
fiduciary duties, it may demand a new standard for rebutting the
presumptions of the business judgment rule —a standard different
from a showing of either gross negligence or an uncorrected conflict
of interest.39 The question of good faith in corporate law is thus more
than the question of defining terms in vague legislation. It is the
question of creating a new standard under the business judgment rule
and thereby realigning the balance between authority and
accountability in corporate law jurisprudence.
In spite of the importance of these questions and the magnitude
of their implications, the Delaware courts seem not to have been
interested in pursuing them. The mystery of good faith has been a
part of Delaware la w for as long as the business judgment rule. It has
been an express component of the rule at least since the oft-cited
Aronson formulation appeared in 1984 and an explicit part of the
statute since it was amended in 1987. Yet the concept was unexplored
37. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
38. See Arsht, supra note 2, at 662 (“Often the Delaware courts have framed the Business
Judgment Rule as a presumption that the directors acted in good faith and in the honest belief
that they were acting for the best interests of the corporation.” (citations omitted)).
39. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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for almost two decades, until the chancery court’s development of
good faith jurisprudence in 2003.
B. The Jurisprudence of Good Faith
Many corporate law decisions discuss good faith,40 but a
significant trend has emerged in a handful of recent decisions that not
only discuss a fiduciary duty of good faith but also rely upon it as the
basis of the decision. These cases suggest that good faith is more than
just a new spin on old dicta. It is a ratio decidendi. Does this mean
that the judiciary, having suddenly awakened to the puzzle of good
faith in corporate law, has at last found a way to operationalize the
principle in fiduciary duty analysis?
The cases described in this Section develop Delaware’s recent
jurisprudence of good faith. The leading opinion is the chancery
court’s 2003 decision in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,41
which established good faith as an independent basis of decision and
represented the first effort by a Delaware court to engage in a
sustained analysis of good faith as a principle of fiduciary duty.42
After discussing Disney itself, this Section addresses Unsecured
Creditors of Integrated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins,43 the first case
to follow and apply the reasoning of Disney, and finally, discusses
Levco Alternative Fund v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n,44 a Delaware
Supreme Court decision that preceded the chancery court’s decision
in Disney but which nevertheless suggests additional contexts for
good faith analysis.
1. Disney. The Disney litigation revolved around the now
infamous stint of Michael Ovitz as president of the Disney
40. See, e.g., cases cited at supra note 5. See also Grogan v. O’Neil, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1282,
1293 (D. Kan. 2003) (treating good faith as the functional equivalent of waste and stating that
“to prevail on either [breach of good faith or waste], plaintiff must show that the board’s
decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of
the corporation’s best interests”); Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch. Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 75 (De l.
1997) (“Failure of an otherwise independent-appearing board or committee to act
independently is a failure to carry out its fiduciary duties in good faith . . . .”).
41. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
42. The opinion discussed in this Section and referred to throughout this Article as Disney
is the chancery court’s 2003 decision that established good faith as an independent basis for a
fiduciary duty complaint. The chancery court’s 2005 decision, after trial, is discussed at infra
notes 285–306 and accompanying text.
43. C.A. No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
44. 803 A.2d 428 (Del. 2002).

01_GRIFFITH .DOC

2005]

2/6/2006 4:00 PM

GOOD FAITH BUSINESS JUDGMENT

17

Corporation. Michael Eisner, Disney’s CEO and a longtime friend of
Ovitz, hand picked him for the job and insisted on his hiring over the
objections of several Disney board members.45 Eisner personally
handled many of the details of Ovitz’s hiring, including the
negotiation of the employment agreement and, not long thereafter,
the severance agreement.46 Ultimately, Ovitz’s tenure with Disney
was brief and undistinguished. He left the company after fifteen
months.47 His total compensation, however, was inversely
proportional to the quality and quantity of his effort. For his pains,
Ovitz was paid approximately $140 million in stock, cash, and
options.48
Not surprisingly, this rather lavish compensation package
became the subject of a shareholder derivative suit against the Disney
board. The case wended its way through the Delaware courts for
years. After an initial dismissal by the court of chancery in 1998,49 the
case reached the Delaware Supreme Court on appeal in 2000 in
Brehm v. Eisner.50 The Brehm opinion was strongly prodefendant,
holding (1) that the board’s decisions to hire, fire, and compensate
Ovitz, while certainly unfavorable to Disney,51 did not amount to
45. Disney, 825 A.2d at 287.
46. Arguably, the most glaring error in the negotiation of the contracts was that the
employment agreement created incentives for Ovitz to seek a no-fault termination rather than a
long term relationship with the company. The chancery court summarized the situation as
follows:
Under a non-fault termination, Ovitz was to receive his salary for the remainder of
the contract, discounted at a risk-free rate keyed to Disney’s borrowing costs. He was
also to receive a $7.5 million bonus for each year remaining on his contract,
discounted at the same risk-free rate, even though no set bonus amount was
guaranteed in the contract. Additionally, all of his “A” stock options were to vest
immediately, instead of waiting for the final three years of his contract for them to
vest. The final benefit of the non-fault termination was a lump sum “termination
payment” of $10 million. The termination payment was equal to the payment Ovitz
would receive should he complete his full five-year term with Disney, but not receive
an offer for a new contract. Graef Crystal opined in the January 13, 1997, edition of
California Law Business that “the contract was most valuable to Ovitz the sooner he
left Disney.”
Id. at 283.
47. Id. at 282–85.
48. The measure is approximate due to the problem of valuing the equity and the options.
$140 million is the plaintiff’s measurement of the total cost and may be high. See id. at 289 n.32
(declining to decide the question of value).
49. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 380 (Del. Ch. 1998).
50. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
51. The opinion noted that “the compensation and termination payout for Ovitz were
exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious . . . and . . . the processes of the boards of directors in
dealing with the approval and termination of the Ov itz Employment Agreement were casual, if
not sloppy and perfunctory.” Id. at 249.
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waste;52 (2) that outside of the context of waste, the court would not
review the substantive outcome of board decisions;53 and (3) that the
board’s decisionmaking process did not amount to gross negligence.54
Expressing further sympathy for the defendants, Chief Justice Veasey
emphasized the difference between ideal corporate governance
practices and legally acceptable corporate governance practices:
[T]he law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of
those duties are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal
corporate governance practices. Aspirational ideals of good
corporate governance practices for boards of directors that go
beyond the minimal legal requirements of the corporation law are
highly desirable, often tend to benefit stockholders, sometimes
reduce litigation and can usually help directors avoid liability. But
they are not required by the corporation law and do not define
standards of liability.55

There is a difference, in other words, between corporate law and
corporate governance, a difference that is protected by the principle
of judicial restraint underlying the business judgment rule.
Nevertheless, the Brehm decision granted plaintiffs the
opportunity to replead.56 The plaintiffs did so and found themselves in
chancery court in early 2003, once again facing a motion to dismiss.
By this point in the litigation, however, the duty-of-loyalty claim had
been stripped from the plaintiffs’ complaint. It was now clear that
52. Id. at 263–64.
53. There is no such thing, in other words, as substantive due care. In Chief Justice
Veasey’s words:
As for the plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to exercise “substantive due
care,” we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule.
Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even
decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context
is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.
Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show
that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business
judgment rule.
Id. at 264. It is worth noting the appearance of “good faith” at the end of this quotation. Chief
Justice Veasey’s view, at least in Brehm, seems to have been that good faith is whatever is
beyond the substantive standard of gross negligence, such as irrationality or waste.
54. Id. at 262 (concluding that the “pleading, as drafted, fails to create a reasonable doubt
that the Old Board’s decision in approving the Ovitz Employment Agreement was protected by
the business judgment rule”).
55. Id. at 256.
56. See id. at 248 (“[I]n the interests of justice, we reverse only to the extent of providing
that one aspect of the dismissal shall be without prejudice, and we remand to the Court of
Chancery to provide plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to file a further amended complaint
consistent with this opinion.”).
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apart from Eisner everyone on the Compensation Committee and the
board as a whole was disinterested in the Ovitz hiring,57 that Eisner
did not participate in the Compensation Committee’s review of the
Ovitz contracts,58 and that there was no evidence suggesting Eisner
dominated or controlled the board or the Compensation
Committee.59 Without an argument under the duty of loyalty, the
plaintiffs were left with only a duty-of-care claim, and Disney had a §
102(b)(7) provision entitling the board to dismissal of claims arising
exclusively under the duty of care.60 Without a loyalty component, the
claim seemed to require dismissal.
Instead of dismissing the revised complaint, however, Chancellor
Chandler invoked good faith to rescue it, holding that the plaintiffs
had pleaded “particularized facts sufficient to raise . . . a reason to
doubt that the action was taken honestly and in good faith.”61
Although the chancellor was able to invoke the good faith carve out
in 102(b)(7) as the basis for his decision,62 this application of good
faith was unprecedented in Delaware.63 Good faith had never before
been given an independent doctrinal effect, but had typically been
mentioned in the context of the other two duties, most often as an
57. See Disney, 825 A.2d at 279–85 (describing the membership of the board and
committee and their roles in reviewing the Ovitz hiring and termination decisions).
58. See id. at 280 (describing a meeting of Compensation Committee, of which Eisner was
not a member).
59. See id. at 287 n.30 (noting that the friendship between Eisner and Ovitz is “not
mentioned to show self-interest or domination,” which the court in fact never analyzed).
60. See supra Part I.A.
61. Disney, 825 A.2d at 286.
62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (1999) (providing that indemnification
provisions shall not eliminate or limit director liability for conduct “not in good faith”).
63. The Seventh Circuit, however, applying Illinois law, had recently sustained a claim on
precisely the same basis. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th
Cir. 2001) (invoking good faith as an exception to the corporation’s 102(b)(7) provision). The
Abbott decision involved a board’s persistent failure to comply with government regulation and
followed Chancellor Allen’s often-cited dictum in the Caremark opinion that:
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated upon
ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation . . . only a sustained or
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.
In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). These statements are
technically dicta because the only “holding” of the Caremark opinion is the approval of a
settlement in a derivative action under the duty of care. In basing its decision on these remarks,
the Abbott court ultimately concluded that “a sustained and systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight” can raise doubts concerning the board’s exercise of its duties in good faith.
Abbott Labs. , 325 F.3d at 809.
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aspect of the duty of loyalty.64 In Disney, however, good faith is
separate and distinct from both loyalty and care because the
plaintiffs’ claim could not have survived dismissal under either
traditional fiduciary duty.65
Having thus given good faith a new role in fiduciary duty
analysis, the Disney opinion then had to demonstrate how good faith
analyses would work. Although Chancellor Chandler made several
references to recklessness and intentional disregard,66 throughout the
opinion he applied an analytic technique that essentially alternated
between issues traditionally raised in analyses under the duty of
loyalty, on the one hand, and the duty of care, on the other. This
alternation between loyalty issues and care issues is the opinion’s
most distinctive feature.
Loyalty, in the form of the Eisner-Ovitz relationship, is a theme
that recurs throughout the chancellor’s opinion. Beginning in the
recitation of facts and continuing throughout the opinion, the
chancellor expressed skepticism at the role that the friendship
between the two men might have played in the corporation’s
decisionmaking.67 The opinion emphasizes the friendship over and
over again, repeating the word “friend” or “friendship” fifteen times,
always in reference to the Eisner-Ovitz relationship and usually
accompanied by remarks expressing thinly veiled displeasure if not
outright criticism. For example, in describing the negotiation of the
initial employment agreement, Chancellor Chandler notes that the

64. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
65. There was no basis under the duty of loyalty because it had not been raised on appeal
and no basis under the duty of care because the court was prevented—by the business judgment
rule and the 102(b)(7) provision—from reaching it.
66. Near the end of the opinion, Chancellor Chandler stated:
[T]he facts alleged in the new complaint suggest that the defendant directors
consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t
care about the risks’ attitude . . . . Knowing or deliberate indifference . . . to [the
director’s] duty to act faithfully and with appropriate care is conduct . . . that may not
have been taken honestly and in good faith to advance the best interests of the
company. Put differently, all of the alleged facts, if true, imply that the defendant
directors knew that they were making material decisions without adequate
information and without adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if
the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.
Disney, 825 A.2d at 289. The focus on recklessness and intentional disregard is similar to the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Abbott. See supra note 63.
67. See, e.g., id. at 279 (noting, for the first of many times throughout the opinion, that
Ovitz ha d “been Eisner’s close friend for over twenty-five years”).
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board “passed off the details to Ovitz and his good friend, Eisner.”68
Later, in connection with Ovitz’s termination, the chancellor again
emphasizes the personal relationship, noting that “[Ovitz’s] good
friend Eisner came to the rescue, agreeing to Ovitz’s request for a
non-fault termination”69 and pointing out that “Eisner [handed] his
personal friend, Ovitz, more than $38 million in cash and the three
million . . . stock options.”70
The Eisner-Ovitz relationship, however, falls short of
establishing a breach of the duty of loyalty. Even if one accepts that a
personal relationship can disqualify a director as disinterested,71 the
only member of the Disney board to flunk the test was Eisner, and
none of the usual indicia of “domination or control” were present to
suggest that Eisner’s conflict had spread to the rest of the board.72 If
anything, the facts recited in the opinion suggest a healthy degree of
skepticism on the part of the board, three of whose members raised
objections to Ovitz’s hiring.73 But the chancellor never pursued these
lines of analysis. The loyalty analysis, in other words, is highly
incomplete. Without more, these items would fail to establish liability
under the duty of loyalty. No more is given, however, because the
chancellor is not raising the Eisner-Ovitz friendship to prove a breach
of the duty of loyalty, but rather as a relevant component of the
analysis of good faith.74

68. Id. at 287. The court repeated its emphasis on this point, noting that “[n]egotiation over
the remaining terms took place solely between Eisner, Ovitz, and attorneys representing Disney
and Ov itz.” Id.
69. Id. at 288.
70. Id. at 289. The court again described the role of the Eisner-Ovitz friendship in the
transaction with disapproval when it described Ovitz as having gone “to his close friend,
Eisner,” with whom he had worked to “develop[] a secret strategy that would enable Ovitz to
extract the maximum benefit from his contract, all without board approval.” Id. at 291.
71. Nonmonetary ties are now increasingly viewed as adequate to disqualify a director as
independent and disinterested. See, for example, In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d
917, 938–39 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“Beholden . . . does not mean just owing in the financial sense, it
can also flow out of ‘pe rsonal or other relationships’ to the interested party.”), which is
discussed at infra note 220.
72. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
73. Disney, 825 A.2d at 287.
74. See id. at 287 n.30:
The allegation that Eisner and Ovitz had been close friends for over twenty-five years
is not mentioned to show self-interest or domination. Instead, the allegation is
mentioned because it casts doubt on the good faith and judgment behind the . . .
decisions to allow two close personal friends to control the payment of shareholders’
money to Ovitz.
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Between the recurring references to the Eisner-Ovitz friendship,
the Disney opinion focuses on the board’s process in approving the
Ovitz contracts, an issue traditionally considered under the rubric of
the duty of care. Criticizing the approval of Ovitz’s initial
employment contract, the cha ncellor emphasized that it had been
approved without the entire board or any committee having had any
role in the negotiations or signing.75 Reciting a series of facts recalling
the criticism of Trans Union’s two hour board meeting in Van
Gorkom,76 the court stressed that the “[b]oard and the compensation
committee . . . each spent less than an hour reviewing Ovitz’s possible
hiring.”77 Twice the court cited with approval the plaintiff’s allegation
that the board behaved “blindly”78 and once referred to the board as
“ostrich-like.”79 According to the court’s reading of the factual
allegations, the board “chose to remain invisible in the process. . . .
[and] (1) failed to ask why it had not been informed, (2) failed to
inquire about the conditions and terms of the agreement; and (3)
failed even to attempt to stop or delay the termination until more
information could be collected.”80 As in Van Gorkom, such
allegations would typically form the basis of a complaint under the
duty of care, but the court did not pursue the analysis, perhaps
because the business judgment rule and the 102(b)(7) provision would

75. Id. at 288 (describing the process and stating that “the board apparently took no action;
no questions were asked”).
76. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 868 (Del. 1985) (holding a board liable under
the duty of care in connection with the approval of a merger).
77. Disney, 825 A.2d at 288 (emphasis added). The court further emphasized that
neither the Old Board nor the compensation committee reviewed the actual draft
employment agreement. Nor did they evaluate the details of Ovitz’s salary or his
severance provisions. No expert presented the board with details of the agreement,
outlined the pros and cons of either the salary or non-fault termination provisions, or
analyzed comparable industry standards for such agreements. Notwithstanding this
alleged information vacuum, the Old Board and the compensation committee
approved Ovitz’s hiring, appointed Eisner to negotiate with Ovitz directly in drafting
the unresolved terms of his employment, never asked to review the final terms, and
were never voluntarily provided those terms.
Id. (footnote omitted). Again, these concerns echo the Delaware Supreme Court’s concerns
eighteen years earlier in Van Gorkom, in which the Trans Union board approved merger
without a draft merger agreement or written summary and without an expert fairness opinion.
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877–78.
78. Disney, 825 A.2d at 277, 289.
79. Id. at 288.
80. Id. at 289.
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have kept it from getting very far.81 Instead, the court raised these
issues to support the board’s lack of good faith.
What, then, does the chancery court’s 2003 Disney opinion teach
about good faith? At the very least, by sustaining the claim on the
basis of good faith when neither care nor loyalty was available,
Disney shows that good faith has a doctrinal effect that is independent
of either traditional fiduciary duty. The mode of analysis that Disney
supplies for good faith claims, however, is closely tied to the
traditional fiduciary duties. This mode of analysis can be summarized
(somewhat glibly) as follows: First, recite facts drawing both the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty into question. Then, rather than
pursuing either traditional analysis through to a conclusion, alternate
between the two and, in so doing, blend the issues together. Having
thus formed a composite picture of the board’s conduct, conclude that
the analysis raises doubts concerning the good faith of the defendant
directors.
2. Elkins. A similar mixing of the duties of care and loyalty
took place in a still more recent chancery court decision claiming to
follow and apply the chancellor’s reasoning in Disney.
In Elkins, the unsecured creditors’ committee of bankrupt
Integrated Health Services (IHS) pressed fiduciary duty claims
against members of the IHS board in connection with the
compensation package awarded to Robert Elkins, the company’s
president and CEO. Although this package was not as lavish as
Michael Ovitz’s pay day in Disney,82 Elkins benefited from a number
of dubious compensation arrangements, including a large bonus,
option grants, and various loans, the terms of which were regularly
revised to make them more favorable to Elkins.83 The plaintiff
claimed that the IHS board breached the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty in authorizing the Elkins compensation package.84 The
81. See supra Part I.A. Chancellor Chandler’s awareness of this dynamic is evident in his
statement in Disney: “Where a director consciously ignores his or her duties to the
corporation . . . the director’s actions are either ‘not in good faith’ or ‘involve intentional
misconduct.’ Thus, plaintiffs’ allegations support claims that fall outside the liability waiver
provided under Disney’s certificate of incorporation.” Disney, 825 A.2d at 290 (footnote
omitted).
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
83. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, C.A.
No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *13–*25 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
84. See id. at *29 (“One [count] alleges breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the
second alleges breach of the fiduciary duty of care.”).
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defense moved for dismissal of the duty-of-loyalty claim on the
ground that each of the compensation arrangements had been
approved by a majority of disinterested and independent directors;85
after analyzing the interest and independence of each board member,
the court agreed.86 This left only the duty-of-care claim, which, given
the IHS 102(b)(7) provision, seemed to require dismissal. As in
Disney, however, the Elkins court relied on the bad faith exception to
102(b)(7) in denying the motion to dismiss.87
Although it claimed to follow and apply Disney, the Elkins court
expressed some confusion over whether analyses of good faith belong
under the duty of care or the duty of loyalty.88 The court resolved this
confusion by pointing out that good faith analyses could be
conceptualized as belonging under either traditional duty. Good faith
can be viewed as a part of the duty of loyalty, the court pointed out,
because “[a] director cannot act loyally towards the corporation
unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the
corporation’s best interest.”89 Alternately, good faith may be viewed
as a component of the duty of care if the defect is a process failure,
requiring an inquiry into what the board did or did not do to prevent
the loss.90 That the court paused to describe good faith both ways—
and that it located each interpretation in alternative readings of
Disney—suggests once again that good faith has elements of each
traditional fiduciary duty.
Despite its conceptual subtlety in describing good faith, the
court’s actual analysis of good faith is a fairly plain review of the
board processes involved in the approval of each element of the
compensation package. Unlike the Disney court, the court in Elkins
did not continually alternate between the two traditional duties, nor
85. Id. at *30; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001) (allowing a transaction
involving a corporation and one of its directors if a majority of disinterested directors with
knowledge of material facts regarding the involved director’s interests approve of the
transa ction).
86. See Elkins, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *43 (concluding that “all of these transactions
were approved by a board consisting of a majority of independent, disinterested directors”).
87. Id. at 63; see also In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th
Cir. 2003) (relying on the bad faith exception in 102(b)(7) to deny dismissal).
88. Elkins, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *31–*34.
89. Id. at *33 n.36 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
90. See id. at *34 n.37 (“One may alternatively conceptualize the holding in Disney as a
duty of care claim that is so egregious—that essentially alleges the Board abdicated its
responsibility to make any busine ss decision—that it falls within the second exception to the
general exculpating power of § 102(b)(7).”).
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did it even describe its review as an analysis of good faith; it referred
instead to what it called the “Disney Standard”91 and repeatedly
quoted the phrase from Disney that a board may not “consciously and
intentionally disregard[] [its] responsibilities.”92 In its review of the
board’s process in approving Elkins’ compensation arrangements, the
court then dismissed claims wherever it found evidence of
deliberation, and sustained them where it found none.93
The mode of analysis employed in Elkins, where evidence of
board processes are reviewed to either dismiss or sustain elements of
the complaint, if reduced to the principle that the board spend a
reasonable amount of time and effort in deliberation, is inconsistent
with the business judgment rule, which requires only that the board
not behave with gross negligence. How much time and effort to spend
in deliberation is a board decision that, like the decision to make
bottles or bricks, is a matter of business judgment insulated from
judicial second guessing.94 Even without sliding all the way towards
the reductio ad absurdum—where, for example, a board must meet
for more than two hours to approve a merger (a lesson arguably
imparted by Van Gorkom), one hour for CEO compensation, twenty
minutes for plant closure95 —a court that passes judgment on the
reasonableness of board deliberations violates the principle of
nonintervention underlying the business judgment rule.96 Vice
Chancellor Noble sought to avoid this inconsistency by emphasizing
that his court was looking not for evidence of the reasonableness of
deliberations but only for an indication that deliberations had taken
91. Id. at *44.
92. Id. at *46; see id. at *44 (describing the relevant question as “whether any of the
Challenged Transactions was authorized with . . . intentional and conscious disregard to [the]
director’s duties); id. at *46 (stating that to survive dismissal, the pleading must state facts
implying that “a Board ‘consciously and intentionally disregarded [its] responsibilities’”); id. at
*48–*49 (failing to find evidence “that the Defendants intentionally disregarded their
responsibilities”).
93. See id. at *46–*59.
94. Cf. CLARK, supra note 21, at 641 (discussing the decision to make bottles or bricks in
the context of derivative suits).
95. The Elkins court noted this possibility, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument about the
reasonableness of time spent:
Counsel took the following position: “Now we’re not saying if it was 20 minutes, it
would have been okay or if it was 5 minutes, it wouldn’t have been okay. Perhaps 5 or
10 minutes would have been sufficient if there had been some other involvement or
discussion with the expert other than that very brief meeting.” The type of inquiry
counsel may be suggesting is not particularly helpful in evaluating a fiduciary claim.
Elkins, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *52 (footnote omitted).
96. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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place at all.97 One might ask, however, whether the decision not to
deliberate at all, like the decision to deliberate for ten minutes or
twenty, is not also a business decision, insulated from judicial second
guessing by the business judgment rule. But, perhaps, the answer to
this question depends on the unique context of executive
compensation.
In other contexts, boards may decide not to deliberate—that is,
they may defer to management’s judgment—but not in questions of
executive compensation. Elkins states: “While there may be instances
in which a board may act with deference to corporate officers’
judgments, executive compensation is not one of those instances. The
board must exercise its own business judgment in approving an
executive compensation transaction.”98 Why is executive
compensation different? Why is board deference appropriate in other
matters but not here? The answer, obviously, is that management has
an overwhelming interest in setting its own compensation as high as it
possibly can and cannot be trusted to act in the best interests of the
corporation. Because of this conflict of interest, the board cannot
simply defer to management’s judgment.
Executive compensation, in other words, is a special case in
which management’s loyalty cannot be assumed.99 If the board does
not exercise its own judgment to constrain management, there is no
way to be confident that the resulting decision is not the product of
self-interest. Here again, in other words, there is a duty-of-loyalty
concern. Executive compensation is a special case for scrutiny of the
board’s “good faith”—that is, a situation in which the process
requirements of the duty of care will be especially scrutinized for
what is, at its core, a duty-of-loyalty problem. In Elkins, the duties of
care and loyalty are interrelated not only as bases from which good
faith may be conceptualized; they are also intermixed as the
motivating concerns of the analysis. Concerns about loyalty
(management’s interest in maximizing its own compensation) drive
the court’s duty-of-care analysis (board processes).
97. Elkins, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *52 (“The Court does not look at the
reasonableness of a Board’s actions in this context, as long as the Board exercised some business
judgment.”).
98. Id. at *45.
99. See generally LUCIAN AYRE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)
(diagnosing the excesses of executive compensation as a function of the fact that managers,
through boards they control, set their own compe nsation).
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3. Reader’s Digest. Executive compensation issues, however,
are not the only ones to trigger good faith analyses, and the chancery
court is not the only Delaware court to perform them. At the supreme
court level, a very similar analytic technique appears just beneath the
surface of Reader’s Digest, in which the court performed a good faith
analysis without naming it as such.100
The transaction inciting the litigation was a proposed
recapitalization of the Reader’s Digest Association (RDA), the effect
of which would have been to eliminate RDA’s dual capital
structure—two classes of shares, one with voting rights and the other
without, but otherwise identical—in favor of a single class of common
stock with one vote per share.101 However, the proposed
recapitalization created a conflict-of-interest problem because a
control group stood to gain $100 million cash in a buyback of shares
unavailable to any other RDA shareholders.102 The control group
buyback would thus result in a $100 million decrease in the equity
interests of the nonvoting shareholders.103
In a somewhat cryptic order enjoining the proposed
recapitalization,104 the supreme court emphasized two elements of the
transaction. First, in treating the share buyback as the “key to the

100. Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., No. 466, 2002 Del. LEXIS
488, at *6–*8 (Del. Aug. 13, 2002).
101. Id. at *2. The recapitalization also would have added antitakeover prov isions. See infra
note 110.
102. The control group consisted of two large funds that together owned fifty percent of
RDA’s voting shares: the DeWitt Wallace Reader’s Digest Fund and the Lila Wallace Reader’s
Digest Fund. In connection with the recapitalization, RDA would purchase 3,636,363 shares
held by the funds. As a result of the repurchase and recapitalization, the funds would go from
holding 50 percent of RDA voting rights to holding 14 percent. Reader’s Digest, 2002 Del.
LEXIS 488, at *2.
103. Id. at *6. The court explicitly emphasized the already -tenuous financial condition of the
corporation in connection with the additional debt burden required to buy shares back from the
controlling group. See id. (noting the company’s “tenuous financial condition, having recently
committed to a large acquisition, incurring additional debt in order to pay $100 million to the
Class B shareholders”).
104. The Reader’s Digest opinion is unclear regarding, among other things, the standard of
review applied by the court. The plaintiffs challenged both the fairness of the transaction and
the process of the board committee in agreeing to it. Reversing the chancery court on the
question whether the entire fairness standard was appropriate, the supreme court acknowledged
that the burden of showing fairness, although initially resting with the defendants, would shift if
the committee was genuinely independent. In reviewing the committee’s actions, however, the
court found them to be “flawed both from the standpoint of process and price.” Id. at *5. The
court then employed an analysis mixing duty-of-loyalty issues with duty-of-care issues to review
the conduct of the committee. Id. at *6–*8.
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recapitalization,”105 the court focused on the conflict inherent in
taking an action to benefit a control group to the exclusion of, and at
the expense of, other shareholders.106 Second, the court criticized the
process undertaken by the board and its committees in approving the
transaction, admonishing the board for failing to engage a financial
advisor to provide a fairness opinion specifically addressing the
interests of the nonvoting shareholders.107
As in Disney, the supreme court’s analysis of these issues
fluctuated between considerations traditionally raised under duty-ofloyalty (the interest of the controlling shareholders in the buyback)
and duty-of-care (the information asked for and obtained by the
committee) analyses. Having opened both cans of worms, the court
ultimately disposed of neither. The court never fully addressed the
influence of the controlling shareholders’ interest on the committee,
nor did it analyze whether the board’s process fell short of the
standard of care. Instead, it blended both sets of issues in enjoining
the proposed recapitalization.108 This is similar to the analysis of good
faith that later emerged in the chancery court’s Disney opinion, in
which the court oscillated between each traditional analysis without
resolving either one. Moreover, when the Reader’s Digest court
addressed the board committee’s claim that it acted in the best
interests of the corporation,109 it did so with evident skepticism, noting
that the committee’s belief was “perhaps in good faith.”110
105. Id. at *2.
106. The crux of the court’s reasoning with respect to process was that the committee failed
to consider the “specific impact” of the reorganization on each of the former classes of
shareholders, focusing instead on the effect of the transaction on RDA as a whole. See id. at *5
(stating that although the committee “believed it was operating in the interests of the
corporation as an entity” and noting that “the committee’s functioning, to the extent it was
required to balance the conflicting interests of two distinct classes of shareholders, was flawed”).
107. See id. at *6–*7 (“To the extent that the directors did not secure sufficient information
concerning the effect of the recapitalization premium on the Class A shareholders, a serious
question is raised concerning the discharge of their duty of care.”).
108. See id. at *7 (stating that “where, as here, the need for protection outweighs possible
detriment to the defendants if the transaction does not proceed immediately the injunction
should issue”).
109. Id. at *6.
110. Id. (emphasis added). Is this “perhaps” meant to imply skepticism of the board’s good
faith? There is, at any rate, ample reason to be skeptical. In addition to the $100 million
giveaway to the control group, the recapitalization added antitakeover provisions in a manner
reminiscent of what Professor Gordon has referred to as “opportunistic amendment”—by
packaging charter terms that harm shareholder welfare along with terms that have positive or
ambiguous welfare effects. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. R EV. 1549, 1577–81 (1989) (describing strategic use of “sweeteners,” “add-ons,”
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C. The Substance of Good Faith
In spite of having been made the ratio decidendi in several recent
decisions, the precise meaning of good faith remains unclear. None of
the cases assigning a distinct doctrinal role to good faith in fiduciary
duty analyses has fully specified the steps of that analysis. None has
filled in the content of the emerging doctrine. In the words of former
Chief Justice Veasey, “the jurisprudence of good faith is
unresolved.”111
Several of the cases recite the language of recklessness and
intentional disregard in describing bad-faith conduct. In Disney, for
example, the court emphasizes that “[k]nowing or deliberate
indifference . . . to [the director’s] duty to act faithfully and with
appropriate care is conduct . . . that may not have been taken honestly
and in good faith to advance the best interests of the company.”112
Elkins claims to apply this test, referring to the standard of
“intentional and conscious disregard to [the] director’s duties”113
rather than the more general question of good faith. Building upon
such language, Professor Hillary Sale has articulated an analysis for
good faith that focuses on questions of intent, arguing that directors
fail to act in good faith “when they abdicate, subvert, or ignore [their]
responsibilities, or act with deliberate indifference toward them.”114
Elaborating this standard, Sale states:
Good faith based liability . . . moves the bar from negligent behavior
to deliberately indifferent, egregious, subversive, or knowing
behavior, and thereby raises issues related to the motives of the
actors. . . . Two of the cases . . . that discuss good faith indicate that a
breach of the duty requires motive-based allegations of severely
and “chicken” tactics and noting that “insiders can bundle a wealth-reducing amendment
with . . . an unrelated proposal that increases shareholder wealth”). In Reader’s Digest, the
proposed recapitalization packaged a staggered board and the elimination of shareholder ability
to act by written consent, well-recognized antitakeover provisions, with increased voting power.
See Reader’s Digest, 2002 Del. LEXIS 488, at *2 (describing the terms of the recapitalization
plan). See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. R EV. 887 (2002) (discussing the antitakeover
effect of staggered boards and the inability of shareholders to act by written consent). An
awareness of the potential for opportunism beneath the surface of such a charter amendment
may have caused the supreme court to doubt the good faith of the RDA board.
111. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 448 (2003).
112. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
113. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, C.A.
No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *44 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
114. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. R EV. 456, 486 (2004).
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reckless or seemingly intentional behavior. Situations involving
deliberate indifference or abdication would also cross the line.115

To define the requisite mental state of recklessness or deliberate
indifference, Sale argues that courts hearing corporate law cases
ought to follow the lead of the federal securities laws and, in
particular, the development of scienter in litigation under rule
10b-5.116 She then offers several situations that illustrate a state of
mind—intentional disregard or extreme recklessness117 —which would
enable a court to find liability under a separate standard of good
faith.118 Professor Sale’s analysis of good faith has recently been cited
with approval in a chancery court decision.119
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to resist an explanation of
good faith that would reduce its amorphous character to a standard
based on intent or, perhaps, based on anything else. First, the resolute
fact specificity of Delaware jurisprudence has continually frustrated
attempts to harden fiduciary standards into clear rules.120 Delaware’s
115. Id. at 488–89 (footnotes omitted).
116. Id. at 489–94. Elaborating the use of scienter, Professor Sale states:
Under such a standard, known or obvious infractions of corporate rules or
governance standards, or failures to create such standards, would be actionable.
Fiduciaries who fail to perform assigned tasks and to set up mechanisms to ensure
that they are aware of such tasks would also be actionable. And, of course, good faith
reliance on the reports or information of others would still defeat such claims.
Id. at 490.
117. These include situations in which the directors (1) “benefited in a concrete and
personal way from the purported fraud,” (2) “engaged in deliberately illegal behavior,” (3)
“knew facts or had access to information” that indicated the information they relied upon was
inaccurate, or (4) failed “to check on information they had a duty to monitor.” Id. at 491–93
(quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000)).
118. In Professor Sale’s words:
Although a breach of good faith need not be intentional or conscious, it does require
some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious failure. . . . [M]otive is relevant, but not
required. Intentional misstatements or omissions are actionable and intentional
breaches of fiduciary duties should be as well. But, as the Disney cases make clear,
allegations of unintentional but flagrantly reckless actions or inactions are also
problematic and, if proved, are breaches of good faith responsibilities.
Id. at 493–94.
119. See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consol. Civ. Action.A. No. 16415,
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, *142–*43 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (citing Professor Sale’s article with
approval and criticizing directors for “consciously disregarding” shareholder interests when they
“knew, or at the very least had strong reasons to believe,” that a transaction was unfair).
120. Allen, Jacobs, & Strine , supra note 20, at 1294:
[T]he almost infinite potential variation in the fact patterns calling for director
decisions, the disparate time frames within which different boards may be required to
act, and the divergent skills and information needed to ma ke particular business
decisions, usually make it impossible for courts to articulate ex ante precise guidelines
for appropriate fiduciary action in future cases.

01_GRIFFITH .DOC

2005]

2/6/2006 4:00 PM

GOOD FAITH BUSINESS JUDGMENT

31

recent history is no exception. As I discuss in further detail in Part II,
at the same time that Delaware courts were rediscovering the concept
of good faith, they were destabilizing settled doctrinal paradigms in
the areas of change of control121 and director independence.122 It
would be odd indeed if in the same year that Delaware eschewed
doctrinal stability in these other areas, it settled the previously
amorphous notion of good faith around a core concept of scienter.
At another level, defining good faith in terms of recklessness or
intent does not solve the problem of distinguishing good faith from
the duty of care. Because intent and recklessness can be characterized
as negligence and negligence similarly can be recast as intent, either
analysis will ultimately ask whether the board was careful or prudent
according to some standard of conduct. Questions of negligence and
intent both focus on how individuals direct their attention. Because
attention is a scarce resource—there are too many perceptual
influences (whether sensory experiences, intellectual puzzles,
memories, or distractions) to focus on all of them at once—
individuals must choose how to direct their attention. They must
decide, in other words, what they will pay attention to and what they
will disregard. This decision can be characterized equally as
intentional or negligent. In the context of driving, for example, I
might have to decide how to allocate my attention between the road
and a conversation on my cell phone. If I choose to talk and drive and
subsequently cause an accident, my decision can be described as
negligent driving or, just as easily, as intentional disregard of the road
in favor of an engrossing conversation. Negligence merely sets the

After attempting to organize fragmented decisions into a single coherent doctrine, two
distinguished commentators accurately predicted what would come of their prediction:
“Predicting the course of Delaware law from prior case law is like watching clouds. They seem,
at times, to take on recognizable shapes and forms, even to resemble something familiar. But
you know that whatever shapes you think you see can vanish in a puff of wind.” Lawrence A.
Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor:
A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 1626 (1994).
121. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 933–39 (2003) (applying
enhanced scrutiny of deal protection devices and requiring that merger agreements contain a
fiduciary out). Omnicare is further discussed at infra note 220. For a full discussion of the
Omnicare opinion and its several departures from existing doctrine, see generally Sean J.
Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS
Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569 (2004).
122. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937–39 (Del. Ch. 2003) (relaxing
the traditional tests of director independence in the context of derivative suits). Oracle is further
discussed at infra note 220.
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standard of reasonable attention in doing something,123 but the
decision to direct one’s attention can still be understood as a question
of intent—that is, the choice to allocate attention to one place rather
than another.124
Tort law distinctions between negligence and intent—in which,
for example, someone intends to tap, not to kill, an “egg-shell skull”
plaintiff—do not work in the context of board decisionmaking.125
Whatever the board is deciding, its intent, consistent with fiduciary
principles, is always the same —to maximize corporate welfare. To
frame the question of whether they are doing it as they ought to as a
matter of recklessness or intentional disregard is merely to conduct
the negligence inquiry under another label. Moreover, because the
business judgment rule eliminates the negligence standard in
corporate law,126 conducting such an inquiry is inconsistent with
settled doctrine. Any attempt to distinguish the recklessness inquiry
by limiting it to extreme deviations from the norm must encounter the
objection that corporate law already has doctrines, such as gross
negligence and waste,127 for dealing with extremes.128 Chief Justice
Veasey’s strident rejection of substantive due care in Brehm means
that a bad outcome, short of waste, cannot be a basis for liability.129
And the business judgment rule means that misdirected attention,
short of gross negligence, cannot give rise to liability.130 Once intent is
123. Consider the Hand formula: the burden of care should equal the probability of loss
times the magnitude of harm. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (developing the Hand formula : “[i]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P”).
124. Another way of saying the same thing is to say that negligence is merely misdirected
attention. We say that attention is misdirected when it is significantly diverted towards
something else, leaving a less-than-reasonable residual allocation of attention on the action that
caused the harm.
125. This distinction does not work well in torts either, where defendants are said to take
their victims as they find them, whatever they actually intended. See, e.g., Bruneau v. Quick, 447
A.2d 742, 750 (Conn. 1982) (stating that “defendant took the plaintiff as he found her”).
126. See supra Part I.A.
127. See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that “waste
entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie
beyond the range of what any reasonable pe rson might be willing to trade”); Francis v. United
Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 819–26 (N.J. 1981) (demonstra ting that a director’s alcoholic stupor
can result in gross negligence).
128. Significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Disney board’s action
in the context of the Ovitz compensation dispute was neither gross negligence nor waste. See
supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
130. See supra Part I.A.
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collapsed back into negligence, a scienter-based standard of good
faith thus merely repeats the analytics of the duty of care. Moreover,
if this standard seeks to apply a test other than gross negligence or
waste, it is inconsistent with the business judgment rule.
It may be that a rewrite of the business judgment rule is just what
advocates of a scienter-based duty of good faith have in mind,
perhaps for valid normative reasons.131 My only point here is a
descriptive one—that is, to point out that moving good faith to a
substantive standard of intent does not avoid repitition of duty-ofcare analytics and, ultimately, confrontation with the business
judgment rule. Furthermore, again as a purely descriptive matter,
reducing good faith to a substantive standard of intent does not fully
capture the more subtle pattern of analysis in the good faith cases.
True, several courts have said that good faith involves questions of
intent and recklessness, but they have not seriously attempted to
probe the directors’ subjective mental state.132 Instead, what courts
have done in analyzing good faith is to raise issues under each of the
traditional fiduciary duties, mix them together, then conclude that the
board’s conduct has thrown good faith into doubt. It is difficult to
reduce this pattern of analysis to scienter or perhaps to any
substantive standard, and attempts to do so are subject to the
criticism that they credit what courts say without paying adequate
attention to what courts do.
In the next Part, I seek to provide a more accurate account of the
recent good faith jurisprudence. It attempts to describe good faith in a
way that does not reduce it to a substantive doctrine with a rigid core
principle. Good faith, it argues, is not a substantive standard. It is a
rhetorical device.

131. Professor Sale, for example, argues that good faith can improve corporate governance
by breaking hardened doctrinal paradigms:
The value of a separate good faith duty . . . is in its potential for addressing those
outrageous and egregious abdications of fiduciary behavior that are not simply the
results of bad process or conflicts. And, of course, its real value is not simply in the
compensation it can provide to, for example, Disney shareholders, but in the ex ante
role it can play in changing the behavior and incentives of corporate fiduciaries and,
thereby changing corporate governance.
Sale, supra note 114, at 494. As mentioned at supra note 16, it is debatable whether increasing
board accountability to courts—whether through good faith or any other jurisprudential tool—
will improve corporate governance by more than it costs.
132. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consul. Civ. Action.A. No.
16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, *145 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (a cknowledging that “divining the
operations of a person’s mind is an inherently elusive endeavor”).
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II. GOOD FAITH AS A RHETORICAL DEVICE
Good faith, in my view, is not now and is not likely ever to
become a doctrine of subrules and multipart tests. It is more subtle
and elusive. It has, at its core, the basic concern of all corporate law
jurisprudence—the question whether directors are really doing their
best in acting for the corporation—but in seeking an answer, it blends
questions generally thought to arise under the duty of care with those
arising under the duty of loyalty. In seeking to answer the basic
corporate law question, courts applying the good faith standard do
not confine themselves to the analytics of either traditional fiduciary
duty. Instead, good faith is used as a loose rhetorical device that
courts can wield to find liability or enjoin actions that do not quite fit
within established doctrinal categories. In this Part, I develop my
account of good faith as a rhetorical device. Focusing on the pattern
of analysis in the recent cases, Section A identifies the interpretive
methodology underlying good faith jurisprudence as “thaumatrope
analytics.” Section B then emphasizes the contextual contingency of
the good faith cases, an aspect of the good faith thaumatrope that will
serve to connect it, in the next Part, to other evolutionary shifts in
corporate law jurisprudence.
A. Thaumatrope Analytics
To understand the jurisprudence of good faith, it is important
first to understand the pattern of analysis in the recent good faith
cases. Good faith analyses oscillate between elements that
traditionally sound under either of the two traditional fiduciary
duties, care and loyalty.
In the Disney opinion, for example, Chancellor Chandler
analyzed the board’s good faith by emphasizing elements both of
loyalty and care, describing the stages of the board’s decisionmaking
process, but continually returning to remark on the relationship
between “Ovitz and his good friend, Eisner.”133 Process review is, of
course, duty-of-care review, whereas conflict issues raise loyalty
concerns.134 In its good faith analysis, the chancery court oscillated
between the two modes of analysis, repeatedly raising both care and
loyalty conc erns without pursuing either to a conclusion, but rather
switching between both to raise doubts concerning the good faith of
133.
134.

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 287–89 (Del. Ch. 2003).
See supra Part I.A.
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the board.135 Distinctions between the duties of care and loyalty were
similarly blurred in Elkins,136 where the court conceptualized good
faith as a component of each of the traditional fiduciary duties and
then applied an analysis that resembled the duty of care but that was
motivated by concerns arising under the duty of loyalty.137 Likewise,
in Reader’s Digest, the supreme court oscilla ted between an emphasis
on the conflict of interest inherent in the buyback of the control
group’s shares and the process failures of the board structures
approving the buyback and recapitalization.138 By the time the court
added that the RDA board acted “perhaps in good faith,”139 the court
had elicited skepticism on precisely that point.
These analyses of good faith are based on the oscillation between
two preexisting doctrinal standards, care and loyalty. Neither
traditional standard would have enabled the plaintiffs to prevail, but
when spun together, the elements of each analysis make the board
appear to have done something sufficiently blameworthy to rule in
the plaintiffs’ favor. Such tactics have a rich rhetorical history,
recalling the optical illusion produced by the thaumatrope.140 As
described by Professor Leon Lipson, “a Thaumatrope is a device in
which two objects are painted on opposite sides of a card—for
example, a man and a horse or a bird and a cage—and the card is
fitted into a frame with a handle. When the handle is rotated rapidly,
the onlooker sees the two objects combined into a single picture—the
man on the horse’s back or the bird in the cage.”141 Following
Professor Lipson,142 the analogy of a thaumatrope is most often used
135. Disney, 825 A.2d at 289–90.
136. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, C.A.
No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *33–*35 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
137. See supra Part I.B.2.
138. See supra Part I.B.3.
139. Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., No. 466, 2002 Del. LEXIS
488, at *6 (Del. Aug. 13, 2002).
140. Lipson borrowed the metaphor from the philosophical work of Richard Whately. See
Lipson, supra note 14, at 11 (quoting Whately’s description of the thaumatrope).
141. Id.
142. Professor Lipson used the thaumatrope to criticize the legal reasoning in the Allegheny
College opinion, in which Judge Cardozo oscillated between the principles of contract and
promissory estoppel to provide relief for the college:
Now what were the objects painted on the opposite sides of Judge Cardozo’s
Thaumatrope? His trouble was that on the consideration side he had a solid rule but
shaky facts; on the promissory -estoppel side he had a shaky rule but (potentially)
solid facts. He twirled the Thaumatrope in order to give the impression that he had
solid facts fitting a solid rule. Some lawyers think that what emerges instead is a
picture of a bird on the horse’s back.
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by commentators to describe, and often to critique, the opinions of
Judge Cardozo.143 Here I wish to argue that the emerging
jurisprudence of good faith operates as a tha umatrope, but I do not
wish to import the implicit critique.
The Disney opinion clearly resembles a thaumatrope. On one
side of the card, Chancellor Chandler emphasized facts raising issues
under the duty of loyalty and, on the other, facts raising issues under
the duty of care. When he spun the card, the thaumatrope produced
an image of a very bad board of directors, which the chancellor found
may well have violated their duty of good faith. Elkins and Reader’s
Digest work in the same way. The image of good faith produced by
these cases is not a new and distinct doctrinal pillar. It is, instead, the
middle space between the twin doctrines of care and loyalty.
The suggestion that good faith operates as a rhetorical device
oscillating between two substantive doctrinal principles, neither of
which alone would result in liability, opens courts to a charge of
unprincipled decisionmaking. Take a losing claim under both loyalty
and care, the objection goes, mix the rhetoric of both principles, and
suddenly you’ve got a winning claim? Thaumatrope analytics,
however, only appear unprincipled if the two doctrinal categorie s
between which the analysis oscillates are viewed as rigidly formalistic
and hermetically sealed. But care and loyalty, in fact, are not mutually
exclusive. They can instead be described as what Professor Jack
Balkin has referred to as “nested oppositions”—that is, opposed
concepts that also have “a relation of dependence, similarity, or
containment.”144
1. Nested Oppositions, Co-Constitutive Categories, and TwoFers. Doctrinal categorizations and other decisionmaking heuristics
tend to be built on conceptual oppositions.145 Conceptual oppositions
Id.
143. See, e.g., William Powers, Jr., Thaumatrope, 77 TEX. L. R EV. 1319, 1320–21 (1999)
(reviewing ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998)) (quoting Professor Lipson’s metaphor of
the thaumatrope to describe a common criticism of Judge Cardozo’s opinions); Dan Simon, The
Double-Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo, 79 OR. L. R EV. 1033,
1038 n.44 (2000) (observing that the thaumatrope metaphor is often used to critique Judge
Cardozo’s opinions); Mike Townsend, Cardozo’s Allegheny College Opinion: A Case Study in
Law as an Art, 33 HOUS. L. R EV. 1103, 1147 (1996) (asserting that Lipson’s use of the
thaumatrope metaphor to describe Cardozo’s Allegheny College opinion is inaccurate).
144. J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990) (book review).
145. See, for example, Professor Paul’s discussion of the “two-fer,” infra note 158 and
accompanying text.
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are established by opposing two terms in a particular context. The
context of the opposition is crucial because the concepts are not
logically related—and therefore not contradictory—except in a
specific context.146 Balkin illustrates the importance of context with
the colors red and green:
If we say that red and green are opposite colors in a traffic light, we
are not saying that they logically contradict each other. Rather, they
are opposed with respect to the meanings these colors are given in
traffic signals. The context of conventions concerning traffic signals
makes them opposites. In another context, they may be seen as
similar to each other. For example, red and green are both colors of
the natural spectrum, or colors associated with Christmas, while
lavender and brown are not. Thus red and green are seen as
different in some contexts, and are seen as having similar properties
in others. 147

A nested opposition is a conceptual opposition each of whose terms
contains the other, whether through similarity to the opposite,
overlap, or a relation of historical dependence or transformation.148
Recognizing nested oppositions allows ossified categories to be
deconstructed and reconstructed in ways that emphasize similarities
as well as differences,149 revealing “similarities where before we saw
only differences, or historical or conceptual dependence where before
we saw only differentiation.”150
Nested oppositions appear throughout legal doctrine. Balkin
gives the example of negligence and strict liability, which appear as
alternate liability rules, growing out of opposed principles—fault and
compensation. 151 Balkin, however, shows that many of the subrules
and standards of each rule implicate questions ordinarily raised under
its opposite.152 For example, negligence doctrine includes bright-line
rules that determine liability without regard to fault, whereas strict
146. See Balkin, supra note 144, at 1674–75 (explaining that the distinction between logical
contradiction and conceptual opposition, the latter of which depends upon context whereas the
former does not, is occasionally overlooked); see, e.g., T.K. SEUNG, STRUCTURALISM AND
HERMENEUTICS 12–17 (1982) (providing examples to distinguish logical contradictions and
conceptual oppositions).
147. Balkin, supra note 144, at 1674.
148. Id. at 1676.
149. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory , 96 Y ALE L.J. 743, 744
(1987) (describing applications of deconstructive techniques to legal reasoning).
150. Balkin, supra note 144, at 1676.
151. Id. at 1683.
152. Id. at 1683–84.
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liability doctrine returns to fault issues in analyzing causation along
the lines of foreseeability.153 Similarly, in constitutional law, Professor
Julie Nice has found a “third strand” of equal protection
jurisprudence that applies the logic of thaumatrope analytics on the
basis of nested oppositions, or what she refers to as “co-constitutive
categories.”154 Her survey of recent Supreme Court interpretations of
the Fourteenth Amendment provides numerous examples in which
the court goes beyond the formalistic doctrinal categories of
fundamental rights and suspect classifications by focusing on the
relationship between the rights and the class.155 According to Nice,
the co-constitutive relationship between fundamental rights and
suspect classes explains the Supreme Court’s oscillation between the
two traditional categories and the resulting creation of a third analytic
category between them:
The third strand of equal protection analysis recognizes that rights
and classes are mutually constitutive in that rights are partially
marked, defined, and constructed by the classes who do and do not
hold them, just as rights partially mark, define and construct those
classes. . . . The third strand recognizes the interdependence, rather
than separation and isolation, of rights and the classes of rightholders and non-right-holders. 156

Nice develops this analysis of equal protection jurisprudence by
integrating the two traditional lines of analysis and inquiring into the
ways in which each category contains elements that “mark[], define[],
and construct[] the meaning” of the other.157
153. Id.; see also J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 R UTGERS L.
R EV. 1, 4–13 (1986) (describing oppositions in legal rule choices).
154. See Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. R EV. 1392, 1421 (2000) [hereinafter Nice, Antinomies]; Julie A. Nice,
The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-Constitutive
Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. R EV. 1209, 1222 (1999) [hereinafter Nice, Third
Strand].
155. See Nice, Antinomies, supra note 154, at 1392 (stating that “co-constitutive theory
explores both how law shapes society and how society shapes law”); Nice, Third Strand, supra
note 154, at 1215 (defining the co-constitutive thesis with respect to equal protection to mean
“both that rights construct the classes of people who hold (and do not hold) them and that the
status and conduct of these classes construct the meaning of rights. Because rights and classes
are mutually constitutive, the Court can plausibly integrate its consideration of them”).
156. Nice, Third Strand, supra note 154, at 1223–24.
157. Id. at 1225. Professor Nice states the analysis more broadly as follows:
I suggest that co-constitutive theory offers an approach for disrupting and
transcending the antinomies. Put simply, co-constitutive theory suggests that the
antinomic alternatives are not mutually exclusive, contradictory, or even
dichotomous. At a minimum, then, the choices posed are unnecessary ones.
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The basic intuition underlying “nested oppositions” and “coconstitutive categories” has been explained with elegant simplicity by
my colleague Professor Jeremy Paul. Using the more modest
terminology of a “Two-Fer,” Paul argues that such analytic
techniques are pervasive throughout the law as well as in everyday
reasoning.158 In his words:
Suppose you were on a diet and had two rules for yourself. One rule
was that you would allow yourself a small dessert after dinner if you
had skipped lunch on the same day. The other was that you would
allow yourself dessert if you had run your typical four miles that day.
It is 8 p.m. and that small bowl of frozen yogurt is quite tempting.
You reflect back on your day and recall that you had a dry bagel,
nothing on it, and black coffee at noontime. You also cut your run
short after 3 ½ miles. May you indulge?159

Paul’s answer, thankfully perhaps, is that you may. His reasoning,
similar to Balkin’s nested oppositions and Nice’s account of coconstitutive categories, is that “the reason behind both the no-lunch
rule and the four mile requirement is the same.”160 Where the
background rationale for both rules is the same and the dieter has
come close, but not quite succeeded, under each rule, the background
rationale may have been satisfied without formalistically satisfying
either rule. Have the yogurt, Paul says, because you have satisfied the
reason behind the rules even if you have not fully satisfied either of
the two rules individually.161
If a mode of analysis that oscillates between two conceptual
categories—what I have called “thaumatrope analytics”—can be
defended when the concepts have a relation of similarity, overlap, or
historical dependence, the question remains whether there is such a
relationship between the duties of care and loyalty. Are there hidden

Moreover, the choices posed are harmful because eventually they impair our ability
to understand more comprehensively the complex interactions, including the
simultaneous, ongoing, and mutual constitution of law and society.
Nice, Antinomies, supra note 154, at 1415–16.
158. Jeremy Paul, Changing the Subject: Cognitive Theory and the Teaching of Law, 67
BROOK. L. R EV. 987, 1011 (2002).
159. Id. at 1013–14.
160. Id. at 1014.
161. In Professor Paul’s words, “the combination of a light lunch and an almost full workout
is quite likely to be a greater net contribution to weight loss than either one alone. Even though
the rules crafted for the diet are separate, it would be rather stubborn to insist on keeping them
that way.” Id.
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similarities between the two traditional fiduciary duties? Do they
overlap? Are thaumatrope analytics appropriately applied to them?
2. Care as Loyalty and Loyalty as Care. At first glance, the
duties of care and loyalty appear quite distinctive. The basic concern
under the duty of care is prudence, whereas under the duty of loyalty
it is fidelity.162 The question of prudence depends upon whether the
directors have conducted themselves in the management of the
corporation as ordinary persons would in the management of their
own affairs.163 The issue of fidelity, by contrast, involves whether the
directors have put their own interests ahead of corporate interests
and is generally answered by pointing to an unmitigated conflict of
interest.164 These appear as different questions with distinctive lines of
inquiry.
A bit of digging beneath these surface differences, however,
reveals the richly interconnected roots of the two doctrinal
paradigms.165 Start with the duty of care: directors must conduct
themselves as ordinarily prudent persons managing their own affairs.
So far so good, but a moment’s refle ction reveals that an ordinarily
prudent person becomes an ordinarily prudent director only once an
element of loyalty is assumed. How do ordinarily prudent directors
conduct their affairs? A decision is taken with due care when, from an
array of alternatives,166 the directors employ a proc edure to pick the
one that best advances the interests of the corporation.167 Now pause
for a moment to consider what a funny way this is of conceiving what
an ordinarily prude nt persons would do in the conduct of their own
affairs. One might typically assume that an ordinarily prudent person,
in evaluating a set of alternatives, picks the one that provides the
most personal benefit and the least personal cost. A director’s
decisionmaking process, however, can be evaluated only by changing
the referent from the individual director to the corporation. The
question of prudence, in other words, is framed with a tacit element
162. See supra Part I.A.
163. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
165. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 45–47 (linking care and loyalty on a philosophical basis
that is different from, but consistent with, the account in this Part).
166. Delaware law assumes, first and foremost, that directors investigate the terms of a
potential transaction and that they act “in a deliberate and knowledgeable way in identifying
and exploring alternatives.” Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66
(Del. 1989).
167. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, § 8.30(a) (2004).
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of loyalty. The question is not, even when one looks only to the
decisionmaking process, whether it was designed to maximize the
benefit to the individual director (or to the director’s family or alma
mater or some other noncorporate constituency), but rather whether
it was designed to maximize the benefit to the corporation. Until the
corporation is substituted for the individual, it is not possible even to
ask whether the director has followed a reasonable process in making
the decision.168 The process can only be evaluated once its purpose is
understood. The directors must design their decisionmaking process
to benefit the corporation, not themselves, but taking this as the goal
of the process founds the duty-of-care analysis on an element of the
duty of loyalty.
The proximity of the duty of care to the duty of loyalty has
prompted several observers to note that in those rare situations in
which courts have imposed liability under the duty of care, there is
often a sub rosa element of loyalty at stake in the transaction.169
Recognizing this overlap between care and loyalty, an eminent
commentator argues:
Not infrequently, the facts [in a duty-of-care case] suggest that the
directors were actually being sued and held liable because of
wrongful self-interested conduct—for a violation of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty—and the courts’ talk about duty of care is simply a
way of letting the plaintiffs win without having to prove all the
elements of a wrongful conflict of interest transaction. 170

The duty of care, in other words, contains within itself an assumption
that the decisionmaker is motivated by the corporation’s business

168. The information gathered to make a decision to benefit oneself is different from the
information gathered for a decision to benefit someone or something else. With different
objectives, one asks different sorts of questions. For example, a person designing a transaction
to maximize benefits to herself might care about individual income tax consequences, while
someone designing a transaction to maximize benefits to the corporation will care only about
the corporate level consequences.
169. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 20, at 1290 (“ Where courts encountered
troubling instances of director action in cases where the directors had no apparent conflict of
interest, the courts were inclined to ask loyalty-based questions, such as whether the action
constituted a fraud or a ‘constructive fraud’ against the corporation or its minority
shareholders.” (citation omitted)); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1100
(1968) (discussing a case that is apparently a duty-of-care case but noting that “the facts are
heavy with the odor of self-dealing”).
170. CLARK , supra note 21, at 126.
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purpose.171 This tacit subordination of self-interest to corporate
interest is generally discussed under the duty of loyalty but without it
analyses under the duty of care do not make sense.
Now come to the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty turns on the
problem of conflict between directors’ personal and fiduciary
interests. This includes situations in which the directors, rather than
maximizing corporate wealth, divert corporate cash flows or
investment opportunities to themselves, lavish corporate assets and
perquisites on themselves, and cause the corporation to take action to
protect their positions or reputations.172 None of these transactions
would raise an eyebrow if they were entered into at arm’s length with
a third party. The basic problem is that the transaction is not at arm’s
length and involves, in some way, directors self-dealing through the
corporations they control. The intuition that identifies this as an
obvious problem is that the corporation, that collection of wealth
belonging to people other than the director, is likely to get a raw deal
in this kind of bargain. To protect these other people from getting a
bad deal, the law proscribes transactions of this type or, at the very
least, pe rmits directors to enter into them only after satisfying
procedural safeguards.173
Step back for a moment. Worry about the directors’ loyalty arises
from concern that their disloyalty will result in a poor bargain for the
corporation. The concern, in other words, is that conflicted directors
will strike bargains for the corporation that ordinarily prudent
persons would not strike for themselves. This can be seen most clearly
if the non-arm’s-length transactions that raise duty-of-loyalty
concerns are imagined as arm’s-length transactions with third parties.
Would an ordinarily prudent person lease a corporate asset to a third
party on exceedingly generous terms?174 Would an ordinarily prudent
person lavish compensation on a third party and permit the third

171. See generally E. Norman Veasey, Duty of Loyalty: The Criticality of the Counselor’s
Role, 45 BUS. LAW. 2065, 2071–72 (1990) (stating that “even if the business judgment rule is
applicable . . . a directorial decision cannot be allowed to stand if it . . . ‘cannot be attributed to
any rational business purpose ’” (quoting In re J. P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770,
780–81 n.5 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
172. See CLARK , supra note 21, at 14 (describing four paradigmatic conflict-of-interest
patterns, including basic self-dealing, executive compensation, the taking of corporate or
shareholder property, and corporate action with mixed motives).
173. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768–69 (2d Cir. 1980) (self-dealing in
leasing of property).
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party to usurp investment opportunities?175 These are duty-of-loyalty
concerns framed as duty-of-care questions. The phrasing is natural
because, at its core, the duty of loyalty is just a bet that some
situations are likely to lead to careless or imprudent transactions for
the corporation, which is to say that the duty of care is a motivating
concern for the duty of loyalty. Here again the duties overlap.
Taking this view of the fundamental question of corporate law
shows that the duty of care and the duty of loy alty are indeed nested
oppositions. They are co-constitutive. Their meanings overlap as both
seek to answer the fundamental question of whether a particular
decision or a particular transaction is likely to be beneficial to the
corporation. Whether the question is confronted from the perspective
of the duty of care or of the duty of loyalty is just a difference in
approach. To put it another way, the fundamental question
underlying both duties really is good faith. Are the directors doing
their best in acting for someone else? Arguably, that is the only
question in all of corporate law.176 It is simply asked in different ways
in different contexts.177
Because both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty get at the
same fundamental question, it is possible that there will be situations
in which one can answer the fundamental question without checking
all of the boxes for liability under either analytic standard. This is the
key to the tha umatrope. The sides of the disk might be different, but
spinning it reveals a relationship between the two sides. So the picture
becomes a man atop a horse or a bird in a cage.

175. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996) (corporate
opportunities).
176. This view has been attributed to Samuel Arsht, a leader in the Delaware bar, who is
said to have proposed that the Delaware law be simplified to the following principle: “Directors
of Delaware corporations can do anything they want, as long as it is not illegal, and as long as
they act in good faith.” See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work? , 44 UCLA L. R EV. 1009, 1015 (1997) (characterizing the statement as “a completely
accurate description of Delaware fiduciary duty law”).
177. One might argue that the traditional rubrics of care and loyalty had become
exceedingly rule-like and rigid and that the good faith thaumatrope merely restores the law to a
flexible fiduciary standard that asks the essential question: Are the directors acting to advance
corporate welfare? It is, after all, a fair assumption that Chancellor Chandler would not have
resorted to good faith if the interplay of the business judgment rule and Disney’s 102(b)(7)
provision had left room for liability under the duty of care or if the formal independence of the
board and Eisner’s lack of formal control or domination had left room for liability under the
duty of loyalty. Consider, on this point, Professor Roe’s observation that “[h]ad Van Gorkom
survived, one wonders whether boards like Enron’s and WorldCom’s would have been more
alert.” Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV . L. R EV. 588, 633 n.183 (2003).
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B. Crisis as Context
Although the good faith thaumatrope may be viewed as a
coherent approach to problems at the intersection of conceptually
overlapping doctrinal categories, it is an analytic technique that
changes the law of fiduciary duty. The duties of care and loyalty have
traditionally been viewed as distinct, with separate doctrinal
requirements. Now, however, the good faith thaumatrope suggests
that there are situations in which the categories may be blended,
allowing claims to survive when some but not all of the traditional
doctrinal requirements have been met. This blending of substantive
issues fundamentally loosens the doctrinal constraints on the
judiciary. Looser doctrinal requirements enable judges to intervene
more easily in corporate decisionmaking. In other words, by blending
the duties of care and loyalty and removing the need to completely
satisfy either traditional standard, the good faith thaumatrope moves
the frontier on the spectrum of authority and accountability away
from board authority and toward judicial accountability.
Seeing the change in this way, one can ask why and, more
specifically, why now? The duties of care and loyalty, after all, have
long been a part of corporate law. Why then are courts only now
recognizing their interrelationship and bringing good faith forward to
fill the gap? And, now that they have done so, is there not a risk that
the mixing of the traditional standards will overwhelm the distinctions
between them and that the longstanding requirements of each will be
abandoned in favor of more flexible thaumatrope analytics? More
simply, what caused good faith, as I have described it, to appear only
now? And what will prevent good faith from overwhelming the
traditional doctrines of care and loyalty? The answer to all of these
questions lies, I believe, in the interpretive context of the good faith
cases.
The context of the good faith cases was corporate scandal and
economic downturn. 178 In the wake of the accounting debacles at
178. See Ronald Alsop, Reputations of Big Companies Tumble in Consumer Survey, WALL.
ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, at B1 (reporting on results of a Harris Interactive/ Reputation Institute poll
finding that 75 percent of respondents felt that the image of large corporations was either “not
good” or “terrible”); Julie Rawe, Heroes to Heels, TIME, June 17, 2002, at 48 (outlining
improprieties at Tyco, Enron, Global Crossing, and Adelphia and describing the contribution of
these activities to an environment of scandal and distrust). On the coincidence of scandal with
economic downturns in provoking reform, see Gregory Mark, The Legal History of Corporate
Scandal: Some Observations on the Ancestry and Significance of the Enron Era , 35 CONN. L.
R EV. 1073, 1083 (2003) (“As long as corporate managers make us money we not only overlook
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Enron and WorldCom,179 the looting of Tyco and Adelphia,180 the
allegations of celebrity insider trading,181 and revelations of conflict of
interest in analyst recommendations,182 the American corporate
governance system was thrown into stark relief.183 Law reviews hosted
symposia on reforming American corporate governance184 and
published an unprecedented number of articles on corporate law.185
practices that are a bit edgy, but we also make excuses for them and in many cases celebrate the
genius that gave rise to the practices. But when the market goes down, the dark side emerges
and so does public outrage—it is the loss of money that triggers the outrage, not the practices
themselves.”).
179. See generally William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of
Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. R EV. 1275 (2002) (analyzing both the immediate and root causes of the accounting fraud and
resulting collapse at Enron); Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom’s Collapse: The
Overview, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at C1 (describing the fraud and collapse at Worldcom).
180. See generally Peter Grant & Christine Nuzum, Adelphia Founder and One Son Are
Found Guilty , WALL ST. J., July 9, 2004, at A1 (reporting developments in the criminal trials of
Adelphia executives accused of corporate looting); Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Former
Tyco Executives Are Charged: New York Prosecutors Say Ex-CEO, Finance Officer Ran
“Criminal Enterprise,” WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at A3 (describing allegations that the former
CEO and CFO stole more than $170 million from the company, engaged in illegal stock sales
and committed accounting fraud to cover up their activities).
181. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Being Martha Stewart—Will Her Celebrity Status End Up
Doing Her In?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2002, at A25 (arguing that publicly disclosed facts did not
support a charge of insider trading); Matthew Rose & Kara Scannell, Executives on Trial:
Lawyers for Stewart, Bacanovic Vow to Appeal, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A1 (describing the
conviction of Martha Stewart on obstruction of justice charged in connection with the
government’s investigation of her insider trading).
182. See generally Ann Davis & Susanne Craig, Analyze This: Research Is Fuzzier Than
Ever, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at C1 (describing and critiquing the outcome of investigations
into investment analyst conflicts of interest).
183. In a speech before the National Press Club, Henry Paulson, Chairman and CEO of
Goldman Sachs, stated:
In my lifetime, American business has never been under such scrutiny. To be blunt,
much of it is deserved . . . . [T]he Enron debacle and subsequent revelations have
revealed major shortcomings in the way some U.S. companies and those charged with
their oversight have gone about their business. And it has, without doubt, eroded
public trust.
Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Chairman & CEO, Goldman Sachs, Address at the National Press Club,
Restoring Investor Confidence: An Agenda for Change (June 5, 2002) available at http://
www.gs.com/our_firm/media_center/docs/restoring -investor-confidence.pdf.
184. See, for example, Symposium: Enron and its Aftermath, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. R EV. 671
(2002); Symposium: Enron: Lessons and Implications, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2002);
Symposium: Lessons From Enron, How Did Corporate and Securities Law Fail?, 48 VILL. L.
R EV. 989 (2003); Symposium: On Enron, Worldcom, and Their Aftermath, 27 V T. L. R EV. 817
(2003); Symposium: Securities Regulation and Corporate Responsibility, 55 ADMIN. L. R EV.
211 (2003); Symposium: Crisis in Confidence: Corporate Governance and Professional Ethics
Post-Enron, 35 CONN. L. R EV. 915 (2003).
185. According to statistics kept by the Corporate Practice Commentator, in 1999 there
were 235 articles published on corporate law (The Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articles
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Legal academics testified in Washington.186 Editorials and features on
corporate reforms began to appear regularly in the Wall Street
Journal.187 As a result, principles that had long formed the
background context of corporate governance and corporate law
adjudication were suddenly pushed into the foreground and sharply
contested, ultimately leading to a presidential promise,188 federal
legislation,189 and a host of administrative and other rulemaking
proposals.190

of 1999 (2003), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/thompson/1999best.htm (last updated May 23,
2003)), 250 in 2000, (The Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articles of 2000 (2003), http://
law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/thompson/2000best.htm (last updated May 25, 2003)), then 300 in
2001, (The Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articles of 2001 (2003), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/
faculty/thompson/2001best.htm (last updated May 25, 2003)), 350 in 2002, (The Top 10
Corporate and Securities Articles of 2002 (2003), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/
thompson/2002best.htm (last updated May 25, 2003)), and more than 425 articles in 2003 and
2004, (E-mail from Robert Thompson, Editor, Corporate Practice Commentator, to author
(May 21, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)).
186. See, e.g., Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Auditors and Analysts: An Analysis of the
Evidence and Reform Proposals in Light of the Enron Experience (U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, March 5, 2002); Testimony of Frank Partnoy, Enron and
the Derivatives World (U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Jan. 24, 2002);
Testimony of John H. Langbein, What’s Wrong With Employer Stock Pension Plans (U.S.
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Jan. 24, 2002). This testimony is collected in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 145, 169, 487 (Nancy B. Rapaport
and Bala G. Dharan, eds., 2004).
187. See, e.g., Paul Volcker & Arthur Levitt, Jr., Editorial, In Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2004, at A16; John Thain, Editorial, Sarbanes-Oxley: Is the Price Too
High, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2004, at A20; G. Bennett Stewart III, Editorial, Debating Sa rbanesOxley: Why Smart Managers Do Dumb Things, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003, at A16; Stan O’Neal,
Editorial, Risky Business, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2003, at A16; Max Baucus, et al., A Second
Betrayal, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at A12; Arthur Levitt, Jr., Editorial, The SEC’s
Repair Job, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A14.
188. See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on Corporate
Responsibility (July 9, 2002), at 4, available at 2002 WL 1461845 (detailing the president’s tenpoint Accountability Plan for American Business).
189. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. Law No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended at §§ 7201–02, 7211–19, 7231–34, 7241–46, 7261–66, 78o-6, 78d-3, 1519–20, 1514A,
1348–1350 (2003)).
190. The flurry of SEC rulemaking in the wake of the corporate scandals can be seen in the
Commission’s online archives of proposed rules and comments. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
PROPOSED R ULES AND COMMENTS, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml
(last visited May 19, 2005). Other standards-setting and self-regulatory bodies have also been
making rule changes, often at the urging of the SEC. See, e.g., PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BOARD, AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL R EPORTING
PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2004),
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing_Standard_2.pdf; SelfRegulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NASD and NYSE,
67 Fed. Reg. 34,968-01 (May 15, 2002) (approving new NASD and NYSE regulations).
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I cite this chapter in our recent history not to argue that these
reforms were right or wrong, good or bad, but to illustrate the
emergence of a national debate about corporate governance issues.
As a result of the debate that started in late 2001, Delaware’s basic
policy choice—a robust vision of the business judgment rule and
maximum respect for the principle of board authority—was suddenly
less tenable. As the question of board deference versus judicial (or
administrative) accountability moved from the background to the
foreground of the public agenda, decisionmakers who hewed to older,
now openly contested discourses were threatened with serious
rhetorical consequences. The rote application of the business
judgment rule could make a judicial body appear lax and
unresponsive to the national debate or, worse, beholden to
managerial interests.
As evidence that this turmoil was felt by the Delaware judiciary,
consider two addresses, later published as law review articles, by
Chief Justice Veasey. In an address given at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School on December 8, 2000 and published in the
school’s law review in June 2001, Veasey emphasized the principle of
judicial nonintervention in board decisionmaking.191 He drew upon
his court’s opinion in Brehm to illustrate a situation in which the court
would not find liability despite its disapproval of the firm’s corporate
governance practices.192 Veasey further described how the Council of
Institutional Investors lobbied the court to define and adopt a
standard of director independence.193 In spite of finding aspects of the
proposal “interesting,” Veasey argued that the court had to refuse the
Council’s request because “it is not the province of the courts to
‘legislate’ or otherwise impose such rules.”194 Corporate governance
standards would not be incorporated into the law of fiduciary duty on
the view that “[c]odes of best practices or corporate bylaws . . . not
judicial fiat . . . are the appropriate intracorporate vehicle to establish
191. E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate
Governance Practices—Or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. R EV. 2179 (2001). Chief Justice Veasey
repeated the principle of judicial nonintervention several times. See, e.g., id. at 2179–80 (“The
private ordering aspect of [judge-made law] must provide ex ante the contractual stockholder
protections deemed important, as distinct from ex post judicial rewriting of the contractual
framework.”); id. at 2180 (“[C]ourts should be reluctant to interfere with business decisions and
should not create surprises or wild doctrinal swings in their expectations of directorial
behavior.”); id. at 2181 (“Courts do not reach out to monitor boards or to resolve disputes.”).
192. Id. at 2182.
193. Id. at 2182–83.
194. Id. at 2183.
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this type of protocol.”195 Veasey went on to describe what he saw as
good corporate governance practices, but emphasized repeatedly that
these were aspirational ideals to be decided upon by individual
boards, not legal mandates of the court.196
Now fast forward two years to an address given by the same
justice at the University of Iowa Law School on March 6, 2003 and
printed in the Journal of Corporation Law that spring.197 In this
postscandal address, Chief Justice Veasey’s tone was considerably
more cautionary, emphasizing the responsibilities of directors rather
than the restraints on the judiciary, pointing out that “directors must
be careful and work hard to understand the facts behind that which
they are deciding,”198 and underscoring that the lack of a bright-line
rule about excessive compensation “does not mean there are no
limits.”199 The Disney litigation was again mentioned as an example,
but this time it was the 2003 chancery court decision, cited with
approval and used to illustrate how directors may sometimes go too
far.200 Good faith, Veasey then suggested, might be usefully employed
as a doctrinal hook to incorporate the emerging consensus on best
corporate governance practices.201 Stating first that “the utter failure
to follow the minimum expectations of the evolving standards of
director conduct, the minimum expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley, or
the NYSE or NASDAQ Rules . . . might . . . raise a good faith
issue,”202 Veasey later repeated that “it is arguable —but not settled—
that the issue of good faith may be measured . . . against the backdrop
of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SRO requirements.”203 The differences
between the two addresses could hardly be more pronounced. In the
winter of 2000–2001, the chief justice lectured on judicial restraint,
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2188–91. Veasey emphasized: “These are recommended protocols offered as an
aspirational matter only. They do not necessarily drive liability considerations, and they do not
portend how a case will be decided.” Id. at 2190. After his list of corporate governance
suggestions, he emphasized again: “these suggestions are purely aspirational and not necessarily
liability-related.” Id. at 2191.
197. Veasey, supra note 111.
198. Id. at 445.
199. Id. at 447. In the next breath, he suggested that there may be greater space to review
compensation matters: “Judicial review of these kinds of director decisions is not about dollar
amounts in isolation.” Id.
200. Id. at 447.
201. Id. at 446–48.
202. Id. at 446.
203. Id. at 448. SROs or “self-regulatory organizations” refer to the stock exchanges,
including the NYSE, and national securities associations, such as the NASD.
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nonintervention in corporate affairs, and the difference between
corporate governance aspirations and corporate law standards. In the
spring of 2003, however, he lectured on director responsibilities,
available avenues of judicial review of certain board decisions, and
the incorporation of corporate governance standards into corporate
law fiduciary duties. On the last point, the two lectures could not be
more different. Prior to the scandals, Chief Justice Veasey sought to
delineate a hard boundary between corporate governance and
corporate law. After the scandals, the chief justice offered a
conception of good faith that could import “best practices” in
corporate governance into the substantive standards of fiduciary duty.
The very issues advocated by the Council of Institutional Investors
and other would-be “change entrepreneurs” without much success
prior to the corporate crises of late 2001 and 2002 were suddenly
taken much more seriously after events pushed them into the
foreground and made them the subject of public debate.204 Veasey’s
two lectures straddle this shift in the interpretive context of corporate
law. The difference in tone and content between them illustrates
judicial responsiveness to changes in the interpretive context and
Delaware’s sensitivity to federal preemption, a concern Veasey
candidly admitted after leaving the bench. 205
As further evidence of the responsiveness of the judiciary to
shifts in the corporate law discourse, consider another postscandal
article by two sitting members of the chancery court, Chancellor
Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine, that addressed the shift in

204. See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (describing the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act as the result of political tumult when “policy entrepreneurs” were suddenly
influential). For a discussion of “change entrepreneurs” and their role in changing the law, see
Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory , 110
HARV. L. R EV. 1785, 1805, 1807 (1997) (describing both Catherine MacKinnon and Oliver
Wendell Holmes as “change entrepreneurs”). In the corporate law context, academic
commentators have occasionally served as would-be change entrepreneurs in disparaging the
role of Delaware and arguing for federalization of corporate law. Most famously, Professor Cary
characterized Delaware as a destructive “pygmy” in calling for federal incorporation. William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 (1974)
(arguing for an “escape from the present predicament in which a pygmy among the 50 states
prescribes, interprets, and indeed denigrates national corporate policy”).
205. E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. R EV.
163, 163 (2004) (“[V]igilance is needed because Delaware’s corporate preeminence is more
vulnerable to a pervasive federal encroachment now than it was before [the scandals].”).
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interpretive context.206 Expressly recognizing the “tumult” in
American corporate governance,207 Chandler and Strine described the
post-Enron reforms undertaken by the federal government as “a
relatively aggressive move by the federal government and the
Exchanges into the realm of board decision making and composition,
an area where, traditionally, the states have been predominant.”208
The encroachment of highly specific federal rules on what had been
more flexible, “principles-based” state law,209 Strine and Chandler
argue, may be due in part to the failure of Delaware law to respond
with sufficient speed to changes in business practices, specifically
questions of executive compensation:
[I]t can be argued fairly that Delaware’s common law did not react
quickly or aggressively enough to changes in compensation practices
during the last two decades, changes that were so substantial
quantitatively that they required a qualitatively more intense form
of judicial review, through, for example, a reinvigorated application
of the concept of waste. In the past, the Delaware courts had
generally taken a hands-off approach to executive compensation
based on the assumption that this was a matter of business
judgment, which could also be factored into the electorate’s voting
decisions. 210

The authors then suggested that states’ inattentiveness to corporate
governance problems could be corrected through greater sensitivity
going forward:
The 2002 Reforms contain measures reflecting a policy judgment
that the constraints of state law on executive compensation are, in
206. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152
U. PA. L. R EV. 953 (2003).
207. This description appears in the first sentence of the article. Id. at 953.
208. Id. at 959. Later the authors repeat the charge, arguing that:
The most striking feature of the 2002 Reforms is a pervasive and general one: the
extent to which they can be seen as a shadow corporation law that requires public
company boards to comply with a very specific set of procedural prescriptions. This
aspect of the Reforms represents a departure from the general spheres in which the
three principle sources of corporate governance in the American sy stem have
operated.
Id. at 973 (footnotes omitted).
209. Id. at 979 (“From the perspective of Delaware . . . the 2002 Reforms are somewhat
problematic because they supplement our principles-based, substantive corporation laws with a
variety of specific requirements that are not part of any overall system of corporate
governance.” (footnote omitted)).
210. Id. at 1001.
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themselves, inadequate to protect investors against abusive
compensation practices. State law policymakers—including judges
shaping the common law—will undoubtedly be responsive to this
expression of concern and may use it as an opportunity to reflect
more deeply on whether their own policies need adaptation to better
protect stockholders.211

Strine and Chandler are thus offering a prescription on how states can
avoid further federal encroachment: state corporate law courts should
interpret legal standards in ways that permit them to respond flexibly
to shifts in the interpretive context of corporate law.
The chancery court’s 2003 opinion in Disney can be read as an
example of this prescription in action. The Disney litigation, like
Chief Justice Veasey’s two speeches, spans the shift in corporate law
discourse resulting from the arrival of the corporate governance crisis
in 2001 and 2002. The deferential tone of the supreme court’s opinion
in 2000 reflects the last days of the bull market of the late 1990s, when
a promarket, antiregulatory approach ruled the day. With the decline
of the market and the arrival of several highly public scandals the
following year, the world (or at least as much of it as matters to
corporate law policymakers) began to change. Public outrage
emerged as a real constraint,212 and the threat of federal intervention
in corporate governance reappeared.213 Policy mavens actively
debated what ought to be done “to prevent future Enrons,”214 and
people again began to discuss whether control of the nation’s
corporate governance system ought to be wrested away from the tiny
state of Delaware.215 The hitherto backgrounded discourse of
211. Id.
212. See Lucien Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. R EV. 751, 786–88 (2002) (describing “outrage” as a cost
of and constraint on high executive compensation). Professor Roe has demonstrated that the
force of “outrage” varies across cultures and therefore exerts a different quality of constraint in,
for example, the United States and France. Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic
Model of Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI . L. R EV. 1251, 1256–62 (2002). I would add only that the
force of outrage can vary within a single country at different cultural moments—for example, in
times of calm and times of crisis.
213. Professor Roe explains the tendency of the federal government to regulate corporate
governance in response to scandal by analogy to a paradigm from the political science literature.
Congress regulates corporate governance with a fire alarm approach, rather than a policy patrol
approach: “[T]he fire alarm is the scandal or bad economic performance.” Mark J. Roe,
Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. R EV. 2491, 2530 (2005).
214. Harvey L. Pitt, How to Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at A18.
215. George Mellon, Editorial, Can Outside Directors Ride Herd on CEOs? , WALL ST. J.,
July 16, 2002, at A17 (describing “yet another effort building to federalize corporate law”).
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authority versus accountability was brought into the foreground, and
the rhetorical stakes of appearing lax or unresponsive were raised.216
By the time it heard Disney again in 2003, the Delaware judiciary had
internalized this shift in the corporate law discourse.217 More directly,
Disney was a case about compensation, the area in which Chancellor
Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine argued that Delaware had been
least responsive,218 and an area that has recently generated significant
attention and proposals for reform in the legal and financial
literature.219 In this environment, the judiciary decided that it could
no longer remain passive, and the good faith thaumatrope was born.
The jurisprudence of good faith is not the only line of recent
Delaware case law to interpret existing corporate law doctrine in a
way that increases judicial flexibility and, therefore, board
accountability to courts.220 Of all the postscandal decisions
empowering the judiciary vis-à-vis boards, however, the emergence of
good faith in Disney has the most far-reaching potential. By loosening
the doctrinal standards of both care and loyalty to create a new
avenue of judicial intervention in corporate governance, the good
faith thaumatrope promises to increase the judicial scrutiny of board
conduct. This raises the question, discussed in the next Part, of
whether good faith will shift the business judgment rule and realign
the balance of authority and accountability.

216. It is worth noting that 2001–2002 is not the first time this has happened. Professor Roe
has documented several instances, notably including the passage of the Federal Securities Laws
in the 1930s, when the “populist and progressive goal of superseding lax state corporation laws
with more stringent federal standards” was nearly realized. See Roe, supra note 177, at 602–04
(describing various efforts to end Delaware’s primacy in corporate law).
217. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the SarbanesOxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. R EV. 1149, 1202
(2004) (arguing that extrajudicial pronouncements by Chief Justice Veasey and Vice Chancellor
Strine signal that “Delaware judges are fully aware of corporate misconduct and its pernicious
effects on our corporate law system, and that Delaware judges intend to creatively deploy their
arsenal of doctrinal concepts to reinvigorate their assessment of corporate decision-makers”).
218. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
219. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 99; Bebchuk et al., supra note 212.
220. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del. 2003)
(rejecting the established change-of-control paradigm as applied to deal protection provisions);
In re eBay, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11,
2004) (applying the corporate opportunities doctrine to the practice of “spinning”—that is, the
preferential allocation of hot IPO shares); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917,
937–38 (Del. Ch. 2003) (loosening the traditional tests of director independence in the
derivative suit context by accepting that noneconomic ties without any of the traditional indicia
of “domination and control” may draw a director’s independence into doubt).
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III. FLEXIBILITY AND CONSTRAINT:
A THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW RHETORIC
Whether doctrinal flexibility is good or bad for corporate law
gene rally—a point on which there is ample debate221 —it certainly
empowers courts vis-à-vis boards. The real question for an analysis of
221. Flexible law is indeterminate, which commentators argue imposes costs on the
corporation while conferring benefits on corporate la wyers and the state of incorporation. See,
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 601–02 (2002) (summarizing the
costs of indeterminacy arguments); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions
When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 365, 367 (1992) (arguing that indeterminate sanctions overdeter); Douglas M. Branson,
Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND.
L. R EV. 85, 108 (1990) (linking indeterminacy to the public choice account of corporate law);
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. R EV. 1205, 1208 (2001) (arguing that indeterminacy enables Delaware to engage in
price discrimination); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. R EV. 1908, 1946 (1998) (arguing that indeterminacy makes it
difficult for other states to copy the Delaware package); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. R EV. 469, 515
(1987) (arguing that indeterminate corporate law favors the corporate bar); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of
Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–7 (1999) (discussing the problem of overdeterrence in the
context of uncertainty). On the other hand, flexible law may encourage innovative transactions
and prevent well-counseled clients from evading the rationale behind the rule. See, e.g., Allen,
supra note 27, at 898 (“[C]ertainty . . . creates the risk that . . . corporate management . . . might
deploy such well-defined rules cleverly (and technically correctly), but with the purpose in mind
not to advance long-term interests of investors, but to pursue some different purpose.”); Ian
Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U.
CHI . L. R EV. 1391, 1403–08 (1992) (book review) (analyzing the role of “muddy defaults” in
triggering optimal bargains); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1095 (1995) (arguing that where
each party has a probable claim in the entitlement, muddy defaults facilitate bargaining when
parties cannot predict ex ante which of them will win in litigation); Tom Baker et al., The
Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. R EV. 443, 446 (2004)
(showing, through behavioral experimentation, that deterrence goals can be achieved by
increasing uncertainty—i.e., volatility—without increasing expected sanctions); Jill E. Fisch, The
Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L.
R EV. 1061, 1081 (2000) (“Delaware’s indeterminate corporate law . . . induces negotiation and
removes some incentives for strategic behavior. . . . Delaware’s lawmaking is uniquely
structured to maximize responsiveness to changing business developments. Delaware reduces
the potential for rent seeking in connection with the lawmaking process.”); Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. R EV. 577, 604 (1988) (describing the importance
of oscillation between muddy and crystalline rules); Leo E. Strine, Delaware’s Corporate-Law
System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A
Response to Kahn & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. R EV. 1257, 1259 (2001) (stating that “much of Delaware corporate law’s
indeterminacy and litigation intensiveness is an unavoidable consequence of the flexibility of the
Delaware Model, which leaves room for economically useful innovation and creativity”). It is
tempting to conclude that this debate about flexibility and indeterminacy is itself indeterminate.
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corporate law jurisprudence, however, is the relative freedom or
constraint of the judiciary in using that flexibility. If the judiciary is
largely unconstrained by doctrine, is it also unconstrained in injecting
itself into board decisionmaking? Or are there other sources of
constraint, apart from corporate law doctrine, that limit the ability of
the courts to realign the authority/accountability balance? If the
flexibility of corporate law doctrine empowers judges, what weakens
or threatens them?
A. Judicial Power and Judicial Constraint
The authority of corporate law judges in Delaware is contingent
upon having jurisdiction—in the literal sense of speaking law—over
the nation’s most important corporations. This jurisdiction is subject
to two pervasive threats: corporate migration and federal preemption.
If enough corporations leave Delaware, the law that Delaware judges
speak will have fewer listeners, thus reducing the judiciary’s ability to
make national corporate law. And if the federal government passes
legislation or regulations moving corporate law, in whole or in part,
into the federal sphere, the authority of the Delaware judiciary over
those matters is effectively preempted.222 Building upon a classic
political science model of judicial behavior, in which judges act to
protect their authority,223 one might expect judges to respond to these
pressures in the only way they know how—through the rhetoric of the
judicial opinion. This forms the basis of a model of corporate law
rhetoric. Rhetorical devices such as the good faith thaumatrope are
designed to manage threats to judicial authority. This Section
elaborates on these fundamental undercurrents of Delaware law,
222. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977) (respecting the internal
affairs doctrine by denying the federal judiciary the authority to create and impose fiduciary
duties inconsistent with state law, but noting that authority to override state corporate law rests
with Congress).
223. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 2 (1964) (seminal
study of judicial power “to shape, through the peculiar kinds of authority and discretion
inherent in [the] office, the development of a particular public policy or set of public policies”).
This is not to accuse judges of base motivations. Many judges may in fact believe that their
rulings are on the whole beneficial to society. In protecting this benefit to society, then, the
judge will also be motivated to maximize the scope of her rulings and protect the m from
reversal—that is, to protect her own authority. Of course, judges may derive other benefits from
their authority, including reputational rewards and, for Delaware corporate law judges, public
regard as leading economic policymakers. But these motivations need not dominate the desire
to do good, which the judiciary advances, at least in part, by protecting its own authority. See,
e.g., Veasey, supra note 205, at 163 (arguing that preserving the Delaware franchise is in the best
interest of the general public).
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focusing on the ways in which they shape (and are shaped by)
corporate law rhetoric.
Corporate migration—the possibility that corporations will leave
Delaware for another state of incorporation—poses a direct threat to
the state fisc. Incorporations and related taxes and fees are a
significant source of revenue for the state of Delaware,224 the loss of
which would have serious budgetary consequences for the state and
equally serious political repercussions for its elected officials. Most
obviously, Delaware legislators would be forced either to reduce
spending or to increase taxation to make up for any shortfall from
corporate migration, neither of which would be particularly popular
with the electorate. It is therefore sensible to expect legislators,
because they suffer the direct effects of corporate migration, to
remain highly sensitive to corporate suggestions (and threats) that
they may leave the state as a result of inhospitable law.225 However,
because Delaware judges are appointed, not elected,226 and therefore
not directly answerable to those whose taxes are increased or whose
services are reduced, they may have less at stake. That the impact of
corporate migration on the judiciary is indirect, however, does not
mean that there is no impact. Judges are, after all, appointed by
elected officials, who can be expected to screen candidates for their
sensitivity to these issues at appointment and to retaliate at
reappointment should a judge show himself or herself to be
insensitive.227 More directly, the legislature has shown itself willing to
224. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. R EV. 679, 690–92, 724–25 (2002) (detailing revenues that incorporations and
related taxes and fees bring Delaware and arguing that Delaware exerts monopoly power in this
market).
225. These threats may be made by corporate lobbies, such as the business roundtable or
corporate advisors, often packaged as law firm memoranda to clients. For example, the
preeminent law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz circulated several such memoranda at
the height of the takeover controversy, threatening to “leav[e] Delaware for a more hospitable
state of incorporation” and suggesting that “[p]erhaps it is time to migrate out of Delaware.”
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. R EV. 1931, 1959 &
n.95 (1991) (quoting these memoranda).
226. See Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases Without Controversy, 5
DEL. L. R EV. 115, 121–23 (2002) (describing the appointment process).
227. Delaware is lauded for its largely apolitical system of appointments. See id. (noting, in
particular, that political party affiliations must be equally represented on the courts and that
members of the bar, legislative committee members, and the governor all play a significant role
in the selection process). However, the process is apolitical only in the sense of ensuring equal
representation of Democrats and Republicans. A candidate whose political vie ws favored
abolition of the business judgment rule would probably not fare well in the appointments
process.
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reverse the substance of judicial decisions in response to the threat of
corporate migration—Van Gorkom is the starkest example.228 To
avoid reversal—a legislative incursion into judicial authority—judges
may craft opinions to limit the risk of corporate migration, thus
internalizing, albeit for indirect reasons, the constraining effect of this
threat. Finally, although a few reincorporations out of state do not
represent a serious threat to the authority of the Delaware judiciary,
large scale corporate migration poses a direct threat to Delaware
courts as national corporate lawmakers. The judiciary therefore has a
direct incentive to avoid opinions that would unleash a flood of
corporate migration.229
By contrast, whether it is comprehensive230 or piecemeal,231
federal preemption reduces the number of issues over which
Delaware judges effectively speak law and thus poses a direct threat
to judicial authority.232 The legislature, in a reversal of institutional
incentives, may be less sensitive to the threat of federal preemption
228. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the legislative reversal of Van Gorkom).
229. This feature may explain the tendency of Delaware courts to announce narrow factspecific rulings rather than broadly applicable rules that may prompt many similarly situated
firms to leave the state.
230. Federal preemption would be comprehensive only with a system of federal
incorporation with jurisdiction in federal courts. See, e.g., R ALPH NADER ET AL .,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF
GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976); William L. Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum
Standards Act, 29 BUS. LAW. 1101 (1974); Cary, supra note 204; Richard W. Jennings,
Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991 (1976); Donald
E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 BUS. LAW. 1125 (1976). Fullscale federal incorporation has not been seriously advocated since the late 1970s, although
piecemeal preemption has been a nearly constant threat. See infra note 231 and accompanying
text.
231. Piecemeal preemption has taken place through the enactment of federal statutes, such
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, touching on matters of corporate governance. See Pub. Law No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2003) (federalizing several
substantive aspects of corporate governance regulation that had previously been left to state
law, including rules requiring independent audit committees, barring accounting firms from
providing both audit and nonaudit services, barring corporate loans to executive officers,
requiring executive certification of financial statements, and mandating forfeiture of CEO and
CFO incentive compensation in the event of an earnings restatement). Piecemeal preemption
also takes place through SEC rulemaking that supplants state law, such as the “all-holders” rule
after Unocal, which Professor Roe describes as a “Sharp Federal Incursion” on state corporate
law. See SEC Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (2003); SEC Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10
(2003) (reversing the narrow holding of Unocal, which allowed selective self-tenders, with a rule
requiring tender offers to be made to all holders); Roe, supra note 177, at 616, 619.
232. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 79 (2005) (describing the longstanding ambition of the SEC to regulate corporate
governance).
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given that, short of a comprehensive regime of federal
incorporation—not presently a serious prospect—federal law does
not offer corporations an alternative to organizing in states or to
paying state franchise fees,233 and as long as Delaware’s franchise fees
are safe, state legislators are less likely to be concerned. But, because
the state courts lose some measure of their authority with every
federal incursion into what would otherwise be the domain of state
law, an authority-maximizing judiciary will remain highly sensitive to
the threat of federal preemption. Indeed, these concerns predominate
in Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine’s recent call for
greater judicial responsiveness to precisely those issues that are most
likely to pique federal interest.234
In order to preserve its place in corporate lawmaking amid these
threats to its authority, the judiciary must respond, and the only way
that it can respond is through the rhetoric of the judicial opinion. As a
speech act designed to accomplish some end,235 the essential function
of rhetoric in corporate law jurisprudence is thus revealed as the
protection of judicial authority from the twin threats of corporate
migration and federal preemption. Rhetorical devices, such as the
good faith thaumatrope, force open rigid doctrines to permit the
judiciary greater flexibility in responding to these threats, or
alternately, countervailing devices, such as the business judgment
rule, allow courts to promise less intervention. The dynamic interplay
of these rhetorical devices in different interpretive climates is what
gives corporate law jurisprudence its basic shape: When federal
preemption looms large, as in periods of scandal and crisis,236
corporate law judges manipulate doctrine to increase management
accountability in hopes of quieting calls for federal intervention.
When the risk of federal intervention recedes, however, the corporate
lobby may reassert itself, pressing the le gislature and, indirectly, the
judiciary to return to a position of board deference. This motion,
forward and back, along the authority/accountability spectrum as a
function, not of law, but of the extralegal pressures exerted upon the
233. Short of a comprehensive regime of federal incorporation, federal corporate law could
threaten Delaware revenues if it preempted so much of the scope of corporate law that it made
the state of incorporation essentially irrelevant. The incremental steps toward federalization of
corporate law, however, seem well short of this point.
234. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
236. See Karmel, supra note 232, at 80 (noting that the SEC “from time to time, has
exploited scandals in the public securities markets” to achieve the goal of regulating corporate
governance).
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judiciary, is the essence of corporate law jurisprudence. The rhetorical
devices, whether “good faith” or “intermediate scrutiny” or “business
judgment,” are the tools that the judiciary employs to accomplish this
motion.
The remainder of this Part applies this theoretical model to
corporate law jurisprudence, first illustrating the pattern of regulation
and retreat in a brief review of corporate law history, then arguing
that the same forces of doctrinal expansion and contraction are likely
to play a central role in the evolution of the jurisprudence of good
faith.
B. Expansion and Contraction
Corporate law doctrines expand and contract as a result of
pressures on the judiciary. Board accountability increases in periods
of scandal and crisis, only to decrease again as the crisis recedes. This
is a recurring pa ttern in corporate law, documented recently by
Professor Roe.237 Of the various episodes of expansion and
contraction,238 the one that may be most illustrative of the likely
evolution of good faith is the one that began with the “watershed”
year of 1985.239
237. See Roe, supra note 177, at 641–43 (illustrating this pattern over a forty-year survey of
Delaware corporate law and finding that “[s]tate competition’s effect on Delaware seem[ed]
comparatively subdued in the 1970s and early 1980s” when “the federal threat seem[ed] to
influence Delaware more,” but then “in the late 1980s, [when] the federal players [left] the
scene [,]” promanagement decisionmaking reemerged and continued throughout the 1990s, until
the reemergence of federal pressure in “with the Enron-era scandals”).
238. A story similar to the account of takeover jurisprudence argued in this Section can be
told, for example, about the 1977 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977), in which the court essentially held that a board must have a
business purpose for a cash-out merger, only to be reversed, in 1983, by Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983), which held that boards were under no such requirement and
merely had to meet loose procedural standards in such transactions. The Singer decision arose at
a time when the federalization of corporate law was actively debated, and the decision arguably
caused the SEC to curb the more restrictive aspects of its rulemaking on cash-out mergers.
Compare Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14185 (Nov. 17, 1977) (proposing a rule that
included a fairness test as well as disclosure requirements in such transactions) with Securities
Exchange Act Release Nos. 6100, 6109 (adopting a final rule without a fairness test). Professor
Roe documents a number of such incidents at “recurring breakdowns” in American corporate
governance. Mark J. Roe, The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance, in
R ESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 9, 13 (Jay W. Lorsch et al. eds., 2005) (describing
recurring breakdowns and various legal and institutional responses).
239. See E. Norman Veasey, The Roles of the Delaware Courts in Merger and Acquisition
Litigation, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 849 (2001) (“The year 1985 was a watershed in Delaware
corporate u
j risprudence.”) Chief Justice Veasey continued, in unusually florid prose, to
emphasize the tensions confronting the Delaware judiciary as they decided these cases:
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1. The Watershed Year. The corporate law jurisprudence that
emerged in Delaware in 1985 was, like the recent post-Enron
decisions, a product of crisis and controversy. The late 1970s and early
1980s were a time of general economic malaise, with high inflation,
high interest rates, and ultimately, recession and unemployment.240
American companies seemed to be losing ground to Japanese rivals,
with observers predicting dire consequences for the national
economy. At the same time, hostile takeover activity exploded.241
Takeover battles became public events, spilling over from
boardrooms to the mainstream media, legislatures, and courtrooms.242
The financiers who engineered these acquisitions were vilified for
fiddling while Rome fell—getting rich while the deals they made
resulted in plant closures and layoffs, endangering the national
economy and leaving ordinary workers without jobs.243 If the public
was largely opposed to takeovers, corporate managers were even
more so,244 thus presenting state politicians with a unique opportunity
to unite the interests of wealthy campaign-contributing corporate

At the height of the takeover era the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Supreme
Court found themselves trying to navigate through a ferocious tempest of mergers
and acquisitions. The high velocity winds of the economics of these transactions were
swirling around time -honored jurisprudential concepts of fiduciary duty of directors.
Change was in the air! The stability of the anchor chain of the business judgment rule
was severely strained.
Id.
240. JERRY W. MARKHAM, 3 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 70–73 (2002)
(describing the economic environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s as a time of rapidly
increasing inflation and shocks in the world oil market resulting in action by the Federal
Reserve Board to constrain inflation by increasing interest rates, leading to a recession, with
unemployment reaching 10.7 percent in 1982).
241. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI . L. R EV. 871, 873–74 (2002) (providing
statistics on the takeover wave of the early- and mid-1980s and noting that “[a] substantial
portion of the deals during this period were hostile takeovers or defensive transactions
undertaken in response to hostile takeovers”).
242. Takeover battles generated a new vocabulary, involving “junk bonds,” “raiders,”
“white knights,” “crown jewels,” “shark repe llants,” “poison pills,” and “scorched earth
defenses.” See, e.g., K NIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS 3 n.1 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds.,
1988) (translating the new lexicon). The obvious connotative value of the se labels provides
fairly clear guidance on the identity, in popular opinion, of the good guys and the bad guys.
243. See, e.g., WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987) (film pe rsonifying this
Manichean view of takeovers in the seductively evil character of Gordon Gekko).
244. See, e.g., Who Likes Takeovers? , FORBES, May 18, 1987, at 12–16 (describing a 1987
Harris public opinion poll showing that 58 pe rcent of respondents viewed takeovers as harmful,
whereas only 8 percent thought them beneficial).
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managers with rank-and-file voters.245 On the other side, however,
were the academics and shareholder-rights advocates whose
arguments resonated not in the mainstream media,246 but in
Washington where, through the early 1980s, the federal government
adopted a protakeover attitude.247
In the thick of this controversy, the Delaware courts handed
down a monumental set of fiduciary duty decisions. In a single year,
the Delaware Supreme Court (1) reset the standard of gross
negligence in Smith v. Van Gorkom,248 (2) restricted the ability of an
incumbent board of directors to resist an unwanted takeover offer in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,249 and (3) set limits on when a
target board could favor one buyer over another in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.250 All three of these decisions
changed the law of fiduciary duty by modifying or inventing doctrines
that empowered the judiciary, shifting the authority/accountability
balance in favor of greater board accountability to courts.
This Article has already discussed the shock of the Van Gorkom
decision.251 In the first of its watershed decisions, the Delaware
245. The outcome of these unified interests was antitakeover legislation. See Mark J. Roe,
Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE, 321, 331 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) (“[L]egislators
who do managers’ bidding do not have to fear reprisal from voters. It is the opposite. Politicians
who bash Wall Street and thwart takeovers are rewarded by the average voter.”); Roberta
Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. R EV.
457, 461 (1988) (describing the adoption of antitakeover statutes by state legislatures and
explaining that “[t]he statutes are typically enacted rapidly, with virtually unanimous support
and little public notice, let alone discussion. They are frequently pushed through the legislature
at the behest of a major local corporation that is the target of a hostile bid or apprehensive that
it will become a target” (footnotes omitted)).
246. Academics have argued, then and now, that takeover defenses obstruct the efficient
transfer of resources, impede the capital market discipline of managers, and hinder the ability of
shareholders to sell their interest at a premium. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case
Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI . L. R EV. 975, 983–84 (2002) (arguing that
boards should not be able to block noncoercive bids); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. R EV. 1161,
1194–97 (1981) (arguing for board passivity in the face of takeovers); Bengt Holstrom & Steven
Kaplan, Corporate Governance, and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the
1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121 (2001) (describing the arguments of takeover
proponents); Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in K NIGHTS,
R AIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 242, at 314, 329–37 (describing positive economic effects of
bust-up takeovers).
247. See Roe, supra note 177, at 16 (“At the time, powerful policymakers in Washington
favored takeovers.”).
248. 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
249. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
250. 506 A.2d 173, 184–85 (Del. 1985).
251. See supra Part I.A.
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Supreme Court changed the law not by creating a new standard, but
by applying an old one, gross negligence, in an unprecedented
manner. Because a looser interpretation of gross negligence means
more opportunities to hold directors accountable for their actions, the
majority’s interpretation of gross negligence moved the barrier
between board authority and judicial accountability—in this case, the
business judgment rule itself—to permit greater judicial intervention
in corporate governance.
Similarly, Unocal promised to increase the scope of judicial
intervention in takeovers by giving courts a say in which takeover
defenses were appropriate and which were not.252 Prior to Unocal,
courts had treated board actions in the takeover context with roughly
the same deference as board decisionmaking in any other context. As
long as the target board could claim some benefit to the corporation
from resistance, takeover defenses were permitted under the
“business purpose” standard,253 which essentially applied the business
judgment rule to takeover defense.254 In Unocal, however, the court
expressly recognized the possibility of an entrenchment motivation
underlying a takeover defense and therefore refused to grant simple
deference to the board.255 Instead, the court created a new
“intermediate standard” between the deferential business judgment

252. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
253. See Cheff v. Ma thes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) (“ [I]f the [board’s takeover defense
was] motivated by a sincere belief that the [takeover defense] was necessary to maintain what
the board believed to be proper business practices, the board will not be held liable for such
decision, even though hindsight indicates the decision was not the wisest course .”). Although
aware of the potential entrenchment motivation for takeover resistance, courts did not allow
this theoretical possibility to overcome the principle of board authority. See, e.g., Bennet v.
Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) (finding a conflict of interest on the part of a board that
used corporate funds to repurchase in order to protect its own control). The apparent
willingness of the Bennett court to acknowledge a target board’s conflict of interest in the
takeover context was qualified in later opinions. See e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287,
292 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding the trial court’s jury instruction that the business judgment rule “is
rebutted only where a director’s sole or primary purpose for adopting a course of action or
refusing to adopt another is to retain control”).
254. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624, 627 (Del. 1984) (holding that the “bedrock”
principle of the business judgment rule was “equally applicable here in the context of a
takeover”).
255. The court stated:
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
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rule and strict “entire fairness” review,256 thus increasing the
accountability of boards to courts in the takeover context.257
Like Unocal, the Revlon decision emerged from a takeover
battle.258 After a series of maneuvers designed to frustrate Ron
Perelman’s hostile bid, the Revlon board ultimately negotiated a sale
of the company to a preferred buyer at a price lower than Perelman’s
bid. 259 This, the Delaware Supreme Court held, went too far.260 In so
holding, the court created so-called “Revlon duties,”261 a special case
256. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 252–60
(1989) (reviewing the operation and effect of Unocal scrutiny). Like the recent jurisprudence of
good faith, intermediate scrutiny is constructed on a rhetoric that mixes categories in developing
a new basis for judicial intervention in board decisionmaking. Intermediate scrutiny occupies
the middle space between the entire fairness standard and the business judgment rule.
257. The new standard ultimately tested the proportionality between the threat to target
shareholders and the target board’s response, requiring that the response have an “element of
balance” and be “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The
threat in Unocal itself was Mesa’s two tier-tender offer, which promised shareholders who
tendered a better mix of consideration (primarily cash) than shareholders who chose not to
tender (junk bonds), thus pressuring shareholders who wished to avoid the back-end
consideration to tender regardless of whether they considered the transaction optimal. Unocal’s
response was a tender for its own shares. In evaluating proportionality, however, the court failed
to analyze the coerciveness of Unocal’s tender offer, which replicated the essential structure of
the Mesa offer. Those who did not or could not tender their shares in the offer would continue
to be shareholders of Unocal, but after the massive front-end payout, their shares would be
worth far less than the front-end offer of seventy-two dollars. See Michael C. Jensen, When
Unocal Won over Pickens, Shareholders and Society Lost, FINANCIER, Nov. 1985, at 50, 51
(finding that the market value of remaining Unocal shares was thirty-five dollars). Worse still,
the effective back end of the Unocal offer, unlike the Mesa offer, created no appraisal rights for
recipients because they simply remained Unocal shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262
(2001) (establishing appraisal rights for shareholders who exchange their shares for
consideration, not for those who remain holders). In this way, the Unocal offer had exactly the
same structure as the Mesa offer and was, if anything, more coercive, yet the court deemed it to
be a proportional response to the Mesa threat. This hidden deference, under the surface of
Unocal itself, did not become clear until later. See infra notes 263–72 and accompanying text.
258. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 (Del. 1985).
259. As a “white knight,” Forstmann agreed to buy Revlon and let incumbent management
run it, provided that management sold off some of the company’s business divisions and
remained capable of servicing its debt oblig ations. Id. at 178–79.
260. Because either transaction would result in the breakup of the corporation, the board
was required to get the most it could for its shareholders. The court stated:
[I]t became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable. . . . The
duty of the board had thus changed from the pre servation of Revlon as a corporate
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’
benefit. . . . The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors’
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.
Id. at 182.
261. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 603 (Del. Ch. 1987).
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in which the deference of the business judgment rule would not apply.
Like the invention of intermediate scrutiny, the creation of Revlon
duties shifted the frontier of the authority/accountability spectrum in
favor of greater board accountability to courts.
In each of these cases, Delaware courts responded to crisis by
creating a means for greater judicial intervention. Van Gorkom’s
revision of gross negligence, Unocal’s invention of intermediate
scrutiny, and the creation of Revlon duties each increased the ability
of the judiciary to intervene in board decisionmaking. All three of the
decisions, in other words, reacted to the climate of controversy by
shifting the balance of power from board authority in the direction of
greater judicial accountability.
2. The Waters Recede . This shift in the authority/accountability
balance, however, did not last. The ultimate impact of each of the
watershed decisions has been either eliminated or substantially
reduced. Van Gorkom has been reversed by the legislature, Unocal
slowly eroded through lax application, Revlon expressly na rrowed.
This retreat from doctrinal innovation is as much a part of corporate
law as the innovations themselves, with important implications for the
development of the jurisprudence of good faith.
As described above, the supreme court’s attempted rewrite of
the business judgment rule in Van Gorkom did not survive the
legislature.262 With the adoption of § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, the management lobby won an
amendment effectively overturning the decision.263 This episode fits
nicely with the standard political economy account of Delaware
corporate law: legislators are sensitive to changes in the law that
might cause corporations to leave and, when they can be persuaded
that the courts have made such changes, are apt to undo them.264
Although the retreat from intermediate scrutiny was more
gradual, there is a sense in which Unocal did not last much longer
262. See supra Part I.A.
263. The threat to leave Delaware may have been especially credible after Van Gorkom
because another state, Indiana, had acted first in passing a statute to shield its directors from
liability under the duty of care. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of
the Insurance Crisis, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION,
AND CONSUMER WELFARE 151, 157 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (pointing out that Indiana’s
statute was enacted prior to Delaware’s and noting its difference in approach).
264. See supra Part III.A; see also Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover
Statutes, 73 VA . L. R EV. 111, 120–22 (1987) (describing the coalition explanation of takeover
legislation).
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than Van Gorkom. Within a few months of Unocal itself, the supreme
court, in Moran v. Household International, applied intermediate
scrutiny to uphold the adoption of a poison pill, arguably the most
significant structural defense in a takeover target’s arsenal,265 thus
signaling a retreat from strong readings of Unocal.266 An even clearer
sign of Unocal’s surrender, however, came five years later in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., in which the
Delaware Supreme Court validated the “just say no” defense, holding
that a target board does not have to remove defensive devices when
confronted by a plainly superior offer.267 If Unocal scrutiny permitted
the “just say no” defense, it was difficult to argue that the standard
provided a serious check on target board conduct in takeover
battles.268 Later decisions have further solidified the ability of boards
to refuse offers that are not coercive but merely “inadequate,”269
allowing practitioners to conclude that “‘just say no’ is alive and
well.”270
265. Poison pills work by making hostile tender offers prohibitively expensive. However, a
company with a poison pill alone is not takeover proof. See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note
110 (describing the combined effects of takeover defenses).
266. Moran v. Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) .
267. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). In Time, the court
stated:
Plaintiffs’ position represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of review
under Unocal principally because it would involve the court in substituting its
judgment of what is a ‘better’ deal for that of a corporation’s board as to directors. To
the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done so in certain of its opinions,
we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis.
Id. at 1153.
268. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. R EV. 511, 551
(1997) (arguing that ability of boards to resist takeovers ad infinitum “would . . . have a
devastating impact on the control market and, ultimately, would have large scale economic
effects”).
269. Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1557 (D. Del. 1995)
(recognizing as a threat the possibility that shareholders, “tempted by the suitor’s premium,
might tender their shares in ignorance or mistaken belief as to management’s representations of
intrinsic value and future expectations”); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin,
Inc.), 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995) (endorsing the concept of “substantive coercion” and
recognizing the threat that shareholders would mistakenly sell for an apparent premium when
“the board considered Unitrin’s stock to be a good long-term investme nt”); Bernard Black &
Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search For Hidden Value, 96 N W.
U. L. R EV. 521, 523 (2002) (stating that “‘substantive coe rcion,’ [is] a term which one of us now
regrets having introduced . . . to describe how a court might (by squinting) conclude that
shareholders who wished to accept a tender offer were coerced into doing so, merely because
the target’s board considered the offer price to be too low”).
270. See Adam O. Emmerich et al., “Just Say No” is Alive and Well, Wachtell Lipton Rosen
& Katz client memorandum, Dec. 4, 2003 (describing ArvinMentor’s attempted takeover of the
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Unocal, by contrast, is not doing so well. The doctrinal evolution
since 1985 clearly shows a steady decline in the stringency of
intermediate scrutiny. No case has yet overruled Unocal, but given
the fact-specific nature of Delaware law, none has had to.271 Instead,
courts have steadily eroded the application and force of intermediate
scrutiny.272 Professors Thompson and Smith empirically confirmed the
steady erosion of the Unocal standard in a study that gathered all
Delaware decisions citing Unocal between 1985 and the end of
2000.273 The study found that the vast majority of chancery court
decisions and all supreme court decisions outside of the change-ofcontrol context approved boards’ defensive devices in spite of
claiming to apply intermediate scrutiny.274 In sum, little of substance
Dana Corporation and Dana’s use of the just say no defense to remain independent) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
271. See Fisch, supra note 221:
[T]he [Delaware] supreme court . . . appears ready to distinguish or overrule a
precedent without regard to considerations of stare decisis. The absence of attention
to stare decisis is partially a consequence of the fact-intensive nature of the court’s
decisions; the court can easily deny that it is overruling a precedent by using case
specific facts to distinguish its prior holding. Similarly the court can narrow the
precedential effect of its decisions by framing its holdings narrowly and tying those
holdings to specific facts.
Id. at 1078 (footnote omitted).
272. Delaware Supreme Court decisions have narrowed Unocal to situations in which a
board acts unilaterally and adopts a defense that is outside of a “range of reasonable responses.”
See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367, 1388 (stating that the “ratio decidendi for the ‘range of
reasonableness’ standard is a need of the board of directors for latitude in discharging its
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders when defending against perceived
threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint” (citation omitted)); Williams v.
Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) (applying the business judgment rule to a shareholderapproved charter amendment and stating that “Unocal analysis should be used only when a
board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to
a perceived threat”).
273. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. R EV. 261 (2002).
274. Id. at 284–86. Throwing out incidental citations, the authors found thirty-four chancery
court decisions and eight supreme court decisions applying intermediate scrutiny. They found
nine chancery court decisions that concluded that the target’s defenses were disproportionate.
Id. Among these were AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112
(Del. Ch. 1986) (finding a two-tier self-tender to be a disproportionate response to a
“concededly fair” and “non-coercive” takeover bid), City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’Ship v. Interco,
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“[T]he . . . $74 cash offer did not represent a threat to
shareholder interests sufficient in the circumstances to justify, in effect, foreclosing shareholders
from electing to accept that offer.”), Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049,
1057 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that “a Pillsbury shareholder [might prefer the takeover offer, but]
a stockholder in Pillsbury cannot make that choice unless the Rights are redeemed”), Robert M.
Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1238–39 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“[R]estructuring represents
an unreasonable and disproportionate antitakeover response to the Bass Group proposals, and
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remains of Unocal, and judicial scrutiny of takeover defenses has slid
most of the way back to the business judgment rule.275
Subsequent decisions also weakened Revlon duties. Soon after it
was decided, Revlon could be read to require an auction any time a
target company was acquired, whether for stock or cash, whether as
part of a long-standing business strategy or a sudden tender offer.
This broad reading was later rejected by cases holding that any
process, not necessarily an auction, could satisfactorily maximize
shareholder consideration.276 This reading was also rejected by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Time, which narrowed Revlon duties to
non-“strategic” (primarily cash) deals.277 Time later became the
thus constitutes a violation of the defendants’ fiduciary duties under Unocal entitling plaintiffs
to an injunction.”), Tate & Lyle Pub. Ltd. Corp. v. Staley Cont’l, Inc., Civ. A. No. 9813, 1988 WL
46064, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (“[P]laintiffs have shown a reasonable probability that the
Funding Trust, as presently enacted, is invalid and that they will suffer irreparable harm if the
Funding Trust becomes immediately funded upon any change in control of Staley.”), and
Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug.
27, 1987) (“If, as currently appears, it is determined that the board engaged in conduct wrongful
to plaintiffs in order to get [the merger] proposal to a shareholder vote, any approval thus
obtained will necessarily be invalidated.”). It is worth noting, however, that several of these
decisions were later criticized by the supreme court in Time. See supra note 267.
275. See generally Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Life And Adventures Of Unocal—Part I: Moore
The Marrier, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 85, 143 (1998) (stating that “Unocal was created, debated, and
turned into the equivalent of the business judgment rule”); Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen
Years Later (and What We Can Do about It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 492, 512 (2001) (“Unocal was
to provide the theory that Household International lacked, but the lesson of Unocal’s first fifteen
years is that the Dela ware Supreme Court’s march toward an unarticulated and unjustified
preference for elections over markets, however understandable in its original motivation, has
proven to be a failure.”); Paul L. Regan, What’s Left of Unocal? , 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 969
(“Moran’s Unocal promise—of fiduciary accountability for the board’s use of a pill in the face of
an actual offer—has vanished.”); Roe, supra note 177, at 625 (noting that Delaware “consciously
sought to be ‘proportional’ for most of the 1980s” but that “at the end of the decade, with the
1989 Time-Warner decision, . . . Delaware turn[ed] anti-takeover”).
276. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (“Revlon does not
demand that every change in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated
bidding contest.”). See generally Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53
(Del. Ch. 1989) (holding that Revlon duties do not require the best price but rather the best
transaction).
277. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51 (Del. 1989). Because
Time had not “abandon[ed] its long -term strategy [to] seek[] an alternative transaction [also]
involving the breakup of the company,” the supreme court held that the Time board was not
required to maximize short term consideration and pursue a transaction with Paramount rather
than Warner, its preferred merger partner. Id. at 1150. The court specified two circumstances in
which Revlon duties were implicated:
The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initiates an active bidding process
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up
of the company. However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to
a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative
transaction [also] involving the breakup of the company.
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exception that swallowed the rule because the vast majority of
acquisition transactions in the 1990s were structured as the kind of
“strategic” transactions that did not implicate Revlon duties.278
So what happened? What explains the judiciary’s retreat from its
own doctrinal innovations? Federal preemption was a significant
threat to the Delaware judiciary in the early - and mid-1980s, when
protakeover forces were strongest in Washington. These decisions can
be read in part as a prospective response to this threat. The watershed
decisions responded to the pressures on the judiciary by shifting the
authority/accountability balance, empowering judges at the expense
of directors and promising some limitation on the ability of target
boards to resist takeover.279 At the same time, however, there was
also a significant promanagement lobby. Hence, intermediate
scrutiny.280 Later, because the preemption threat did not last,281 but
rather faded as the takeover discourse settled to the background of
academic (as opposed to public) debate,282 corporate and business
lobbies were able to increase the pressure on Delaware to moderate
its takeover jurisprudence. The legislature passed antitakeover
legislation and reversed Van Gorkom. The courts began to
understand that the real threat to their authority was now from the
promanagement interests represented in the legislature, which
Id. (citation omitted). Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. qualified this rule
slightly by holding that Revlon duties could be triggered by a stock-for-stock deal that caused a
target corporation to go from being diffusely held to having a controlling shareholder who
would dominate the corporation going forward. 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993).
278. See Joseph H. Flom, Mergers & Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L.
R EV. 753, 761–62 (2000) (stating that friendly transactions far outnumbered hostile ones in the
1990s).
279. It is worth noting that the promise of greater judicial scrutiny of takeover defenses did
not successfully avert all federal incursions into the state-law territory. Consider, on this point,
the SEC’s all-holders rule adopted soon after Unocal, which effectively banned the exclusionary
self-tender used by Unocal and blessed by the Delaware Supreme Court. See supra note 257.
280. Unocal scrutiny was thus intermediate not only in splitting the difference between the
business judgment rule and entire fairness and in combining aspects of loyalty and care, but also
in mediating the influence of public outcry (that the law do something about takeover and
takeover defense) and the political concerns of Delaware and its interest groups (that Delaware
not do too much to restrain management).
281. See Andrew G.T. Moore III & Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8
CARDOZO L. R EV. 779, 782 (1987) (noting that federal interest in takeovers had waned).
282. At the same time, new “adaptive responses” were invented to alleviate some of the
strain on the market for corporate control caused by antitakeover provisions, including
increasing reliance on outside directors and compensation arrangements structured to
encourage insiders to look more favorably upon takeover proposals. Adaptive re sponses
arguably reduce the harm of judicial deference to takeover defenses. See Kahan & Rock, supra
note 241, at 873, 890–93.
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threatened to wrest control of corporate law.283 As a result, courts
began to apply Unocal less aggressively and to narrow Revlon.
This, then, is the rhetorical structure of corporate law. Loose
doctrinal constraints permit constant jurisprudential motion, forward
and back on the authority/accountability spectrum, in response to
pressur es on the judiciary. Doctrinal flexibility permits judges to
respond to shifts in interpretive context by increasing or decreasing
their scrutiny of board conduct. This responsiveness is facilitated by
the use of rhetorical devices, such as intermediate scrutiny, that can
support scrutiny in one case and deference in the next.284
C. Uncharted Waters: Disney and Beyond
The good faith thaumatrope is a rhetorical device that can
support scrutiny in one situation, deference in the next. Having
emerged in an environment of scandal and crisis, it retains a loose
doctrinal structure—some elements of care along with some elements
of loyalty—to provide the judiciary with maximum flexibility in its
corporate law jurisprudence. Delaware’s history of expansion and
contraction in corporate law, however, teaches that the flexibility of
good faith at the level of doctrine should not be taken to imply that
judges will have great flexibility, given the constraints of migration
and preemption, in applying it. The Delaware judiciary has never
been free to write corporate law according to its whims. If it shifts the
balance too far in favor of board accountability, it will stir the threat
of corporate migration. If it shifts the balance too far in favor of
board deference, it risks increased federalization of corporate law.
The flexibility of rhetorical devices, including the good faith
thaumatrope, is thus constrained to a range dictated by the prevailing
283. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, The Race to Protect Managers From
Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. R EV. 1168, 1169 (1999) (describing states’ incentives to produce
takeover law favoring management).
284. Unocal is more flexible than Revlon. Although there is some interpretive flexibility in
deciding whether the board’s processes in af ct comply with its Revlon duties, the crucial
question is whether Revlon applies. The rest is an if-then statement: if Revlon applies, then the
board must maximize consideration at sale. Unocal, by contrast, is a flexible, standards-based
adjudication, from the initial determination of reasonable threat assessment to the second step
of evaluating the proportionality of the board’s response to the threat. The greater flexibility of
Unocal may explain why it has survived and remains broadly applicable to any arguably
“defensive” action, whereas the Revlon rule has been limited to a unique transaction form. That
Unocal has, at least until recently, been frequently recited, occasionally applied, but rarely
violated is an indication of the rhetorical climate in which it evolved. In another climate, in
which federal intervention in takeover law remained a real threat, it might have been used more
aggressively.
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interpretive context and the strength and source of the threat to the
court’s jurisdiction.
What does this mean for the likely evolution of the jurisprudence
of good faith? My theory of corporate law rhetoric can now support a
prediction. Because it is rhetorically useful, good faith is likely to
retain the loose character of a thaumatrope, empowering the judiciary
to apply it (or not) depending upon the interpretive context. More
specifically, the good faith thaumatrope is most likely to be used
when public outcry and the possibility of federal intervention put
pressure on the authority/accountability discourse. When, by contrast,
the scandal calms and the economy recovers—a process that, by some
indications at least, began in 2003—there is likely to be less threat of
federal intervention and, therefore, less need for aggressive judicial
oversight of boards of directors.285 Under such circumstances,
corporate law jurisprudence is likely to return to a more deferential
position. Indeed, the retrenchment of deference began as early as
2004, when several of the post-scandal decisions that had increased
the accountability of boards to courts were qualified or narrowed in
subsequent opinions.286 The jurisprudence of good faith seems likely
to follow the same path, perhaps coming to resemble intermediate
scrutiny under Unocal: often recited, occasionally applied, and rarely
violated.
This evolutionary trajectory of good faith is confirmed in the
chancery court’s subsequent decision in the Disney litigation. Having
sustained the plaintiffs’ claim in his 2003 opinion, 287 Chancellor
Chandler presided over the Disney trial in the fall and winter of 2004,

285. On the heels of positive stock market returns in 2003 and 2004, a backlash against
aggressive SEC rulemaking and enforcement seems to have caused the agency to signal a partial
retreat. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, SEC’s Chairman Is Stepping Down From Split Panel, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2005, at A1 (noting that “some business groups and administration officials . . .
contended that [outgoing SEC Chairman William Donaldson’s] enforcement and policy
decisions had been too heavy-handed”); Deborah Solomon, SEC to Host Talks on Contentious
Rule, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2005, at A3 (citing re cent examples to suggest that “the SEC is
adopting a more moderate tone as it tries to balance corporate concerns with its mission to
protect investors”).
286. The postscandal decisions are discussed at supra note 220. For cases na rrowing or
qualifying them, see, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004) (narrowing Oracle
and suggesting, more broadly, that social ties are not enough to establish a conflict sufficient to
draw independence into doubt); Orman v. Cullman, No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at *21
(Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (distinguishing Omnicare to uphold deal protections in an acquisition,
like the NCS-Genesis transaction, involving a controlling -shareholder voting agreement).
287. See supra Part I.B.1.
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ultimately issuing yet another opinion on August 9, 2005.288 This latter
opinion give the chancellor a second opportunity to define and
analyze a fiduciary duty claim under the rubric of good faith.
Directors act in bad faith, Chancellor Chandler wrote in the 2005
opinion, when they act “for some purpose other than a genuine
attempt to advance corporate welfare.”289 After suggesting several
examples in which directors may place their own “interests,
preferences or appetites before the welfare of the corporation,”290 the
chancellor fell back on the intentional-disregard language he had used
in the 2003 decision, stating that “the concept of intentional
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities, is
an appropriate (although not the only) standard for determining
whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith.”291 Again, however, the
court’s analysis of intent ultimately focused on process, including, as
in Van Gorkom, the length of the board’s meetings,292 inquiries
typically conducted under analyses of the duty of care.293 To these
discussions of process, the chancellor merely appended a conclusory
assertion that the director in question had acted in pursuit of the best
interests of the company.294
The motivation of this analysis of process, however, was the
court’s suspicion of disloyalty. As Chancellor Chandler emphasized in
288. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
289. Id. at *170 (quoting Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051, n.2 (Del. Ch.
1996)).
290. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). The examples
range from the ordinary (greed and envy) to the fanciful (lust and revenge).
291. Id. at *175 (emphasis omitted).
292. Id. at *208–20 (evaluating the conduct of directors Sidney Poitier and Ignacio Lozano).
The court is aware of the parallel, noting that the “arguments unde rstandably hearken back to
Van Gorkom, where the Supreme Court condemned the Trans Union board for agreeing to a
material transaction after a board meeting of about two hours . . . .” Id. at *210–11. See Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and the discussion at supra note 76 and accompanying
text. In order to avoid parsing the minutes spent on various types of decisions, the chancellor
ultimately concluded that because the discussion of the Ovitz matter went on for a “not
insignificant length of time,” the board had not acted with deliberate indifference. Disney, 2005
Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *216.
293. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (discussing this suggestion with Elkins).
294. See id. at *199 (analyzing Eisner’s conduct and concluding that no evidence showed
Eisner had been motivated by anything other than “the best interests of the Company”); id. at
*205 (analyzing Russell’s conduct and concluding that Russell “was doing the best he thought he
could to advance the interests of the Company”); id. at *207 (analyzing Watson’s conduct and
concluding that “[n]othing in his conduct leads me to believe that Watson had anything in mind
other than the best interests of the Company . . . .”).
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the 2005 opinion, judges will be especially skeptical of “an imperial
CEO or controlling shareholder with a supine or passive board” who
seeks to commandeer the board to satisfy a personal rather than a
corporate interest.295 The ultimate question in Disney, most simply,
was whether Ovitz’s hiring and severance arrangement resulted from
the board kowtowing to a desire on the pa rt of Eisner to spread the
company’s wealth among his personal network of friends. Although
willing to characterize Eisner as an imperial CEO and criticize the
board as not truly independent,296 by 2005 the chancellor no longer
seemed to believe that the Eisner-Ovitz friendship explained Ovitz’s
hiring and firing.297 Such considerations, of course, illustrate the
loyalty side of the thaumatrope. Taken together with the process
analysis, the 2005 Disney decision provides another example of
thaumatrope analytics.
In granting judgment for the defendants on all claims,298 the 2005
Disney decision also illustrates that the balance between board
authority and judicial accountability has has returned to a highly
deferential position. No longer seeking to forge new ground in
corporate law jurisprudence, the 2005 opinion refers to the
shareholders’ complaint as “a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary
duty claim” rather than a claim of bad faith.299 Moreover, Chancellor
Chandler emphasized the distinction between the aspirations of
corporate governance and the requirements of corporate law from the
very outset of the opinion, 300 recalling the themes that former Chief
Justice Veasey had sounded in Brehm and his pre-scandal speeches.301

295. See id. at *192, n.487.
296. Id. at *192–93.
297. Derivations of the word “friend” appear half as often in the 2005 opinion as in the 2003
opinion, and as the trial revealed, the word did not seem to mean as much as one might have
supposed. In his testimony, Eisner emphasized that his relationship with Ovitz was more
accurately characterized as a business relationship. “Michael Ovitz,” Eisner testified, “had a lot
of best friends.” See Laura M. Holson, Eisner, on the Stand, Describes Courting of Ovitz, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at C1.
298. Disney, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *3.
299. Id. at *174.
300. Id. at *4 (“Delaware law does not . . . hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with
the aspirational ideal of best practices . . . .”).
301. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256–57 (Del. 2000) (“Aspirational ideals of good
corporate governance practices . . . are highly desirable . . . . But they are not required by the
corporation law.”); Veasey, supra note 191 (discussing the interplay between corporate law and
aspirational ideals).
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Compare Veasey’s 2001 speech at Penn, previously discussed,302 with
Chandler’s insistence, in the 2005 opinion, that:
other institutions may develop, pronounce and urge adherence to
ideals of corporate best practices. But the development of
aspirational ideals, however worthy as goals for human behavior,
should not work to distort the legal requirements by which human
behavior is actually measured. Nor should the common law of
fiduciary duties become a prisoner of narrow definitions or
formulaic expressions. 303

The pendulum, it seems, has swung back in favor of board authority
and away from judicial intervention.
It is the Delaware Supreme Court that will ultimately decide the
doctrinal status of good faith, possibly in its consideration of the
plaintiffs’ appeal.304 As this Article has argued, the outcome will
depend largely on pressures within the corporate law discourse. If
economic recovery continues, however, and further scandals do not
suddenly arise, the supreme court seems likely to affirm the 2005
decision and to explain the chancery court’s good faith jurisprudence
as a welcome rehabilitation of the duty of loyalty. The chancery
court’s basic emphasis—that directors can be disloyal for a variety of
reasons other than simple financial self-interest—essentially extends
the meaning and reach of the duty of loyalty beyond the narrow
categories into which it had previously been confined.305 This
interpretation would simultaneously retain good faith as an opentextured rhetorical device while also creating a means by which
boards could respond—through, for example, disclosure and approval
or ratification306 —to avoid its application.

302. See supra notes 191–96 and accompanying text.
303. Disney, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *5.
304. The chancellor’s decision was immediately appealed. See Bruce Orwall & Merissa
Marr, Judge Backs Disney Directors In Suit on Ovitz’s Hiring, Firing , WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
2005, at A1 (“Attorneys for shareholders who sued the board said they would appeal the
ruling.”).
305. Chancellor Chandler suggested this himself, quoting an earlier version of this Article to
argue that the real problem is the excessive rigidity of existing doctrinal classifications. See
Disney, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *149 n.402.
306. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2003) (providing that conflict-of-interest
transactions are not voidable if they are approved, ratified, or fair).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has drawn upon corporate law theory and corporate
law history to analyze the Delaware judiciary’s rediscovery of the
principle of good faith. Tracing the principle through a line of cases,
this Article has described good faith as a thaumatrope. In their
discussions of good faith, courts oscillate between loyalty issues and
care issues, finding good faith to be in doubt if issues are raised under
each traditional fiduciary duty, regardless of whether all of the
doctrinal requirements of either standard have been fulfilled.
It is no accident that good faith reemerged during a period of
scandal and crisis in American corporate governance. After Enron,
WorldCom, and the like, the Delaware judiciary faced a heightened
threat of federal preemption, and it responded by loosening its
doctrinal constraints to intervene more actively in corporate
governance. Corporate law history provides several examples of such
shifts toward greater judicial accountability in periods of scandal and
as many examples of shifts back once the scandal recedes and the
threat of corporate migration reappears. Each of these shifts is
accomplished through the invention and deployment of rhetorical
devices. The good faith thaumatrope is one such device, not unlike
intermediate scrutiny or a host of other devices in this repeated
pattern of regulation and retreat. As such, it is likely to follow the
same evolutionary path, being applied less aggressively as the
calamity calms.
This
Article’s
prediction
that
the
shift
in
the
authority/accountability balance brought by good faith will not be
permanent should not be construed as a suggestion that good faith is
unimportant. Good faith is a paradigmatic illustration of the workings
of corporate law jurisprudence, de monstrating both the basic
flexibility of corporate law doctrine and the vital importance of the
political undercurrents both motivating and constraining the judiciary
in its application of doctrine. No understanding of corporate law is
complete without an account of these forces, which is what this
Article, at its core, has sought to provide, elaborating the rhetorical
structure of corporate law through a close analysis of the emerging
jurisprudence of good faith.

